Challenges of Inequality to Democracy by Bellamy, RP et al.
  
International  
Panel on 
Social Progress 
 (https://www.ipsp.org/) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 Chapter 14 – Challenges of Inequality 
to Democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Coordinating Lead Authors:[1] Richard Bellamy, Wolfgang Merkel 
 
2 Lead Authors:[2] Rajeev Bhargava, Juliana Bidadanure, Thomas 
Christiano, Ulrike Felt, Colin Hay, Lily Lamboy, Thamy Pogrebinschi, 
Graham Smith, Gayil Talshir, Nadia Urbinati, Mieke Verloo 
 
3 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
Word count: [34.440] 
 
Abstract: [119 words] 
 
Keywords (website): public equality, embedded democracy, gender 
inequality, populism, democratic innovations  
 
Keywords (index): public equality, embedded democracy, political 
rights and opportunities, participation, representation, deliberation, 
horizontal accountability, multireligious society, gender inequality, 
generational inequality, democratic inequality, populism, promise of 
democracy, technology and democracy, demos, multiculturalism, 
democratic innovations, mini-publics, fairness, marginalization of 
minorities 
 Abstract: 
 
7 Democracy, as we understand it, is a process of collective decision 
making among persons, which issues in collectively binding norms 
for the society of those persons. It is a process of decision making in 
which persons participate as equals in determining the legal and 
conventional norms that bind them and in which the group of 
persons, taken collectively, are sovereign. Democracy can be 
understood as a descriptive term, referring to political societies that 
actually exist, or as a normative ideal for the evaluation of political 
societies. This chapter is primarily about the basic moral principles 
that can justify this egalitarian process of collective decision making 
and on the challenges to understanding and realizing this ideal in the 
modern world. 
Summary: 
 
8 Democracy, as we understand it, is a process of collective decision 
making among persons, which issues in collectively binding norms 
for the society of those persons. It is a process of decision making in 
which persons participate as equals in determining the legal and 
conventional norms that bind them and in which the group of 
persons, taken collectively, are sovereign. Democracy can be 
understood as a descriptive term, referring to political societies that 
actually exist, or as a normative ideal for the evaluation of political 
societies. Our focus in this chapter is primarily on the basic moral 
principles that can justify this egalitarian process of collective 
decision making and on the challenges to understanding and 
realizing this ideal in the modern world. After an initial account of 
the basic principle and the social and institutional realization of this 
principle, we address the challenges to articulating and 
implementing this principle that arise due to the reality of economic 
inequality and the religious, ethnic, gender and racial pluralism of 
modern societies, and to the fact that state-based democratic 
systems operate within a larger global society. We then discuss and 
evaluate the appropriateness of democratic institutions, procedures, 
and organizations to translate the moral principles into the 
structural grammar of present-day democracies and to what extent 
they can guarantee the fundamental principles and normative 
promises of democracy. As we will see, the ideas of equality and 
sovereignty at the base of democracy cannot be fully appreciated 
without a grasp of the pluralism, complexity and global 
interconnectedness of modern societies.  
 
 The Basic Principle 
 
9 We take public equality as the basic normative principle 
underwriting democracy and guiding our efforts to understand the 
challenges that democracy faces. The principle helps us think about 
democracy along two distinct dimensions: procedural and 
substantive. Democracy is grounded in the principle of equality in 
the sense that because persons have equal status and worth, the 
collective decision-making process is meant to realize the equal 
advancement of the interests of the members of the society. The ideal 
of democracy is a uniquely public realization of the equal status and 
worth of each citizen in the sense that all can see that they are 
treated as equals despite all the disagreements and conflicts of 
interest that arise in modern societies. Democracy achieves this by 
giving people an equal say in the making of collectively binding 
decisions and by protecting basic civil rights. This equal say involves 
equality in capacities to deliberate with fellow citizens and equal 
voting power and capacities to negotiate when disagreements 
persist. The challenge is to extend and deepen this idea in the context 
of highly pluralistic and globalizing societies.  
 
 Structure of the Chapter 
 
10 We have structured the chapter along the fundamental challenges 
democracy is facing in the twenty-first century. The first part 
explores the challenges of socioeconomic inequality, gender 
inequality, religious inequality, racial inequality, generational 
inequality, and racial inequality. It then turns to globalization as an 
external threat to public equality, populism as an increasingly 
powerful internal threat within the OECD world, and the challenge 
science and technology pose to democracy. Though these single 
sections focus particularly on the challenges to democracy, they also 
provide some responses to them. The second part of the chapter 
changes the focus insofar as it deals mainly with responses, such as 
some proposals for reestablishing the demos and renationalizing 
democracy, democratic innovations in Europe and Latin America, 
and the democratic norms that should guide the procedures of 
supranational governance. We conclude with suggestions for limiting 
the effects of inequality of wealth on democratic decision making and 
some different ways of organizing electoral systems for increasing 
minority participation.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
11 Introduction: Democracy as 
Public Equality 
 
 
12 Democracy, as we understand it, is a process of collective decision 
making among persons, which issues in collectively binding norms for 
the society of those persons. It is a process of decision making in 
which persons participate as equals in determining the legal and 
conventional norms that bind them and in which the group of 
persons, taken collectively, are sovereign. Democracy can be 
understood as a descriptive term, referring to political societies that 
actually exist, or as a normative ideal for the evaluation of political 
societies. Our focus in this chapter is primarily on the basic moral 
principles that can justify this egalitarian process of collective 
decision making and on the challenges to understanding and realizing 
this ideal in the modern world. After an initial account of the basic 
principle and the social and institutional realization of this principle, 
we will address the challenges to articulating and implementing this 
principle that arise due to the reality of economic inequality and the 
religious, ethnic, gender and racial pluralism of modern societies, and 
to the fact that state-based democratic systems operate within a 
larger global society. We then discuss and evaluate the 
appropriateness of democratic institutions, procedures, and 
organizations to translate the moral principles into the structural 
grammar of present-day democracies and to what extent they can 
guarantee the fundamental principles and normative promises of 
democracy. As we will see, the ideas of equality and sovereignty at the 
base of democracy cannot be fully appreciated without a grasp of the 
pluralism, complexity and global interconnectedness of modern 
societies. The work of this chapter is a collaborative project. 
 
 
 13 The Basic Principle 
 
14 We take public equality as the basic normative principle underwriting 
democracy and guiding our efforts to understand the challenges that 
democracy faces. The principle helps us think about democracy along 
two distinct dimensions: procedural and substantive. Democracy is 
grounded in the principle of equality in the sense that because 
persons have equal status and worth, the collective decision-making 
process is meant to realize the equal advancement of the interests of 
the members of the society. The ideal of democracy is a uniquely 
public realization of the equal status and worth of each citizen in the 
sense that all can see that they are treated as equals despite all the 
disagreements and conflicts of interest that arise in modern societies. 
Democracy achieves this by giving people an equal say in the making 
of collectively binding decisions and by protecting basic civil rights. 
This equal say involves equality in capacities to deliberate with fellow 
citizens and equal voting power and capacities to negotiate when 
disagreements persist. The challenge is to extend and deepen this 
idea in the context of highly pluralistic and globalizing societies. 
 
15 Democracy addresses the question of who gets to decide on the 
collectively binding norms in circumstances of disagreement and 
conflicting interests. Under the assumption that persons and groups 
have only limited understandings of the perspectives and interests of 
other persons and groups, persons and groups are generally biased in 
favor of their own perspectives and interests even when they attempt 
to construct conceptions of the common good, it is important for all 
persons and groups to have a say in the collectively binding decisions 
that constitute the social and political order of a society. Each person 
and group brings their limited and partial perspectives on how 
society ought to be organized and attempts by means of argument 
and negotiation to reconcile their limited points of view with those of 
others. Each thereby is able to stand up for his or her own 
perspectives and interests and is able to learn about those of others. 
In this way, the biases of each person are partly mitigated by a 
process of discussion and negotiation. They are unlikely to reach full 
agreement on how to live together. And thus each is unlikely to be 
fully satisfied that society is organized as it ought to be organized 
since the points of view and interests of many others will have to be 
accommodated. It is not just important that all have a say but that 
each has an equal say. Only in this way can the issue of who decides 
be settled in a way that recognizes and affirms the equal status and 
value of all persons (Christiano 2008). 
 
16 The principle of public equality also grounds the fundamental civil 
rights of persons as well. There are certain basic civil and liberal 
rights whose respect and protection are as important to the public 
realization of the equal status and worth of persons as democracy 
itself is (Habermas 1992). And these rights must be respected and 
protected by democratic decision making just as much as democracy 
itself if persons are to be treated publicly as equals. This substantive 
dimension of public equality is also a source of debate and contention 
(Bellamy 2007). 
 
17 At the same time, the idea of equality at the heart of democracy is 
itself a contested notion. And the challenges addressed in the 
subsequent parts of this chapter bring out some of the main sources 
of contestation. And so the ideal of public equality itself must be 
subject to continual discussion and revision. In this sense, democracy 
is an ideal that is never fully realized among persons. So the ideal of 
public equality serves both as a standard for the evaluation of the 
procedural aspects of the democratic process as well as a principle for 
the assessment of the substantive outcomes of democracy. The most 
obvious way in which it does this is that democratic societies must 
decide how to reproduce democracy themselves in their 
constitutional forms as well as in the social bases of democratic 
participation. In this respect, the discussions of this chapter are 
designed to inform this continual process of reflection on and the 
reproduction of democracy.  
 
 
 
  
19 Social and Institutional Realization of Democracy 
 
20 The principle of public equality, according to which people are to be 
treated as equals in a way that they can see that they are treated as 
equals, is quite abstract and needs to be realized in social and political 
institutions. This chapter is in significant part about the challenges to 
this realization. In order to understand just how challenging this is it 
is important to lay out some elements of a conceptual framework. 
One distinction important for understanding how the collective 
decision making of a society realizes public equality is between the 
deliberative and power dimensions of collective decision making. The 
first looks at how societies enable people to participate as equals in 
the processes of deliberation and discussion that lead up to decision 
making and that form the conceptions of the alternatives societies 
face and the considerations in favor of and against those alternatives. 
The second explores how institutions and societies distribute power 
to persons so that they can advance their views and interests. These 
are not exclusive categories. Many aspects of political decision 
making involve both dimensions.  
 
21 For the deliberative dimension, when a group of people make a 
decision that is binding on all of the members, they must engage in a 
process of discussion to learn about their interests and how those 
interests can be accommodated and advanced in a just and 
harmonious way. This discussion is necessary to constructing the 
decision and thinking about alternatives. This process of deliberation 
does not start merely when a decision has to be made, it is an ongoing 
process that occurs throughout the society over a long course of time. 
It requires processes of discussion within particular sectors of society 
in which interests and conceptions of the common good are 
formulated and debated. And it requires debate and discussion on a 
society-wide level. Of course in a highly pluralistic society the 
participants in this discussion have to listen to each other and try to 
understand each other even when their experiences and the 
problems they face are diverse and unfamiliar to each other. The 
democratic ideal is that they listen to each other as equals. This is an 
extraordinary challenge that many of the sections of this chapter are 
focused on. In particular, the challenge of including and listening to 
people from different ethnic, racial, and religious groups as well as 
different genders.  
 
22 The dimension of power is involved when discussion and debate do 
not resolve all the issues and there is disagreement and conflict even 
though a decision has to be made. Then the distribution of power 
involved in voting, in organizing groups to vote and pressure 
representatives, in negotiating compromises with other groups in 
order to come to a unified standpoint despite disagreement, becomes 
essential to the democratic ideal of public equality. When discussion 
and debate fail to reach consensus, the distribution of power becomes 
essential.  
 
23 To be sure, the dimensions of deliberation and power come together 
in a variety of ways. One especially prominent way is that some 
groups are not listened to because they are marginalized because of 
their ethnicity, race, gender, religion or socioeconomic status. They 
are deprived of power because they cannot participate as equals in 
the process of deliberation (Young 2000). Another important way 
occurs when the inequality of wealth and income in the society play a 
large role in enabling some groups to get their views out and 
disabling others from getting their views out.  
 
24 This suggests a second distinction between formal and informal 
mechanisms that is important to evaluating the democratic quality of 
a process of decision making. There are formal mechanisms and 
rights for giving people power over the collective decision, such as the 
right to vote and the electoral system that aggregates these votes. And 
there are formal mechanisms that enable people to participate in 
deliberation such as the rights of each to express themselves and to 
associate with other likeminded or like interested people. There are 
also formal mechanisms of contestation such as the system of courts 
for contesting the legality of legislative or administrative action just 
to name a couple. These are formal because certain rights are 
assigned to people and the mechanism is designed so that the 
exercise of those rights have legal consequences for the society.  
 
25 There is also the informal character of democracies that consists in 
the extent to which groups actually organize to advance certain 
interests or viewpoints. Are the conditions present so that all the 
diverse interests in society are enabled to advance their interests? 
There is also the previously mentioned question as to whether, when 
a group is formed to present its interests and viewpoints, the other 
members of the society listen to them and take them seriously. 
Modern democratic societies have done reasonably well in 
developing legal regimes that protect the basic political and civil 
rights of their citizens, though there are important issues to be dealt 
with here, as in the question about how future generations can be 
represented in collective decision making. Great strides have been 
made in protecting the civil and political rights of minorities. But it 
remains the case that religious, racial and ethnic minorities are often 
not accorded the respect owed to them as equal citizens in the 
societies. Some of the sections of our chapter are concerned with 
these fundamental inequalities in the deliberative and informal 
aspects of democratic equality.  
 
26 Of course, the egalitarian dimensions of the informal aspects of 
political participation can be enhanced by legislative and 
constitutional action to some degree. For instance, one of the main 
ways in which interest groups find it difficult to organize and exert 
influence on the collective decision process is because the group is 
significantly poorer than the dominant majority. So they have less 
resources with which to participate in the deliberative and 
negotiating process. Furthermore, lower middle class, working class 
and poorer citizens generally have distinctive interests in the society 
but find that they have significantly less resources with which to 
advance those interests. To some extent these inequalities can be 
mitigated by means of campaign finance reform. But the political 
platforms of major political parties and candidates seem to have less 
and less room for these interests in American and European societies. 
They seem to be less and less able to get people to listen to them 
(Bartels 2009). One consequence of this is that we see the rise of 
populist demagoguery in these societies as we discuss later in this 
chapter. We do not discuss the effects of socioeconomic inequality on 
political inequality in this chapter since it is well covered in Chapter 
13. We will however suggest some recommendations for mitigating 
the effects of this inequality.  
 
27 There is a further feature of democracy that is essential to a 
discussion of equality. This involves the ability of a democratic society 
effectively to govern itself. There are two major and connected 
challenges here. The first challenge involves the fact that democratic 
decision making takes place in a context in which there are other 
powerful economic actors in a society that are able to impose costs on 
a democratic society when it makes certain decisions. Large economic 
firms can impose costs on a society when the society tries to regulate 
or tax their behavior and lessen their profitability as in the case of 
legislation to curb the production of pollution or increases in 
corporate taxes (Merkel 2014a). A firm can fulfill a threat to move to 
another jurisdiction if these measures are imposed and the legislature 
may forego important legislation in order to avoid the unemployment 
corporate moves would make. This is an exercise of power outside 
the normal democratic channels and so endows these entities with a 
kind of power in addition to their powers to participate in politics. 
The second challenge that arises here is that democratic societies 
must interact with other political societies to achieve certain aims in 
the international environment. They do this currently by means of 
treaties and agreements. But the processes of treaty making and 
agreement making can also be subjected to democratic norms of 
equality as we will discuss later. It should be noted that those two 
challenges are connected in that international cooperation among 
states can lessen the threats imposed by multinational firms by 
coordination on tax regimes or environmental regimes, to name just 
two examples.  
 28 Structure of the Chapter 
 
29 We have structured the chapter along the fundamental challenges 
democracy is facing in the twenty-first century. The first part explores 
the challenges of socioeconomic inequality, gender inequality, 
religious inequality, racial inequality, generational inequality, and 
racial inequality. It then turns to globalization as an external threat to 
public equality, populism as an increasingly powerful internal threat 
within the OECD world, and the challenge science and technology 
pose to democracy. Though these single sections focus particularly on 
the challenges to democracy, they also provide some responses to 
them. The second part of the chapter changes the focus insofar as it 
deals mainly with responses, such as some proposals for 
reestablishing the demos and renationalizing democracy, democratic 
innovations in Europe and Latin America, and the democratic norms 
that should guide the procedures of supranational governance. We 
conclude with suggestions for limiting the effects of inequality of 
wealth on democratic decision making and some different ways of 
organizing electoral systems for increasing minority participation. 
  
30 Part I: The Challenges to 
Public Equality 
 
 
 
31 1.1 Representation and (Social and Civic) Participation 
– barriers to public equality 
 
 
 
32 Socioeconomic inequality 
 
33 Democracy as public equality is constituted empirically within a 
political system possessing the following five components: (1) a 
democratic electoral regime; (2) political participation rights; (3) civil 
liberties; (4) the institutional safeguarding of mutual constraints and 
horizontal accountability; and (5) the de jure and de facto guarantees 
of the effective power to govern of democratically elected 
representatives. Socioeconomic inequality challenges each of these 
components.  
 
34 The electoral regime 
 
35 Voter turnout has declined moderately in Western Europe and 
drastically in Eastern Europe, while remaining at a problematically 
low level in the United States. Declining electoral participation is due 
to the political apathy of the lower social classes and not to their 
permissive abstention, as some conservative observers argue. While 
the gender gap has nearly closed, selectivity in terms of social class 
has significantly increased. The increasing socioeconomic inequality 
of the last three decades has translated into heightened inequalities in 
cognitive resources and political knowledge across social classes. The 
lower their political knowledge, the less the voters are able to 
translate their interests into corresponding voting preferences. The 
more unequal a society, the greater is the number of voters who are 
unwilling or unable to participate meaningfully in elections. The more 
unequal electoral participation, in turn, the likelier it is that 
substantial representation on the parliamentary level becomes 
similarly distorted. 
 
36 Political rights and opportunities 
 
37 For almost three decades European party systems have been 
changing: the traditional “catch-all parties” are in decline, while more 
specialized or populist parties have emerged ― from ecological 
parties and left-socialist parties to right-wing populist parties. While 
catch-all parties traditionally mobilized lower-class voters better than 
most other parties, the “new” parties rarely represent the interests of 
the lower classes.  Attempts have been made to stop the trend toward 
political exclusion through democratic innovations such as referenda, 
deliberative assemblies, participatory budgeting or citizen councils. 
However, given they are cognitively and politically more demanding 
than voting in general elections, they risk being even more socially 
exclusive. That said, this caveat may apply above all to advanced 
(post)industrial societies and established democracies. Studies of 
Latin America show that in certain contexts, these new forms of 
political participation may intensify the involvement of citizens in 
political processes in their municipalities or even on the national level 
(Pogrebinschi 2012). 
 
38 Civil rights 
 
39 Compared to the early 1960s, when women (Switzerland) or African 
Americans (six US states) were not allowed to vote, when women did 
not enjoy the full range of economic and civil rights in many 
democracies, when homosexuals were criminalized and 
discrimination against ethnic minorities was ubiquitous, the civil 
rights situation has improved considerably. Today’s governments, 
parliaments, parties, and the political elites are under greater 
pressure to be more transparent. Contemporary civic associations are 
more numerous and more political, monitoring politics much more 
closely than some decades ago. John Keane (2011) has even spoken of 
an emerging “monitory democracy.” Yet we are not living in a world 
where civil rights and the rule of law are unchallenged, as recent 
revelations of the surveillance practices of the American National 
Security Agency (NSA), the British Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ), and secret services elsewhere in the world 
have shown. In the age of the Internet, private monopolies such as 
Google also pose a challenge to individual privacy rights. It is also true 
that democratic states must come up with more inclusive and lasting 
forms of selecting, accepting, and integrating immigrants into their 
societies and political systems. Indeed, hard-fought advances in equal 
rights for ethnic minorities have been recently challenged in Europe, 
the United States, Australia, and Asia. On the whole, however, there 
can be no doubt that the overall civil rights situation has improved 
within the OECD world in the past half-century. 
 
40 Horizontal accountability 
 
41 The last decades have seen a weakening of national parliaments. 
Globalization and transnationalization have strengthened executives 
at the cost of parliaments. Governments, from Argentina to Greece to 
Germany, are blackmailing their legislatures in the name of executive 
emergency rights and policy-making imperatives under the real or 
pretended pressures of crisis. The German chancellor Angela Merkel 
notoriously admonished the public and the parliament of the need for 
“market-conforming democracy,” elevating the markets to the status 
of sovereign. Moreover, only governments are represented in supra- 
and international governance regimes such as the IMF, World Bank, 
WTO, and EU. Parliaments, the core bodies of representative 
democracies, have lost key legislative and monitoring powers vis-à-
vis executives. Transparency and accountability have been among the 
first victims as a result. 
 
42 Effective power to govern 
 
43 What governments have gained in power vis-à-vis parliaments on the 
one side, they have lost to the markets on the other. Deregulation and 
globalization have empowered financial actors such as banks, hedge 
funds, investors, and global firms. “Markets” have become the 
principals, governments the agents. If these principals are hit by self-
inflicted crises, as it has been the case with the financial crises after 
2008, they can externalize their problems by forcing governments to 
bail them out.  
 
44 Conclusion 
 
45 In sum, four out of the five components of democracy have witnessed 
democratic erosions over the course of the last decades. Only the 
regime of civil rights has seen considerable improvements. The rights 
of women and minorities (ethnic, religious, sexual) have made 
impressive advances, de jure and de facto in most countries, although 
not completely up to the actual level of men and majorities. In times 
of globalization it seems easier for democratic governments to 
advance noneconomic identity rights than to halt the increasing 
socioeconomic inequalities (Merkel 2014a) in times of deregulated 
global markets and the dominant economic paradigm of austerity 
politics and policies.  
 
46 We do not conclude that “democracy” (singular) is in crisis, since 
there is no theory that can tell us where the threshold between 
challenges to and crisis of the democratic system actually lies (Kneip 
and Merkel in press). It would be wrong to assume that the 
established democracies of the OECD world have already transformed 
into postdemocracies, since there are, rather, asynchronous 
developments that have strengthened the proper working of 
democracies in certain ways and weakened it in others, as we have 
pointed out. We are also not facing the “end of representative politics” 
(Tormey 2015). But what will be discussed in the following chapters 
is to which extent the multiple challenges of inequalities are 
undermining the very idea and practice of democracy and which 
democratic reforms and innovations can reduce the danger of shifting 
axes of democratic legitimacy in the twenty-first century.  
 47 Racial inequality 
 
48 For many, ethnic identity is a point of deep pride and personal 
connection. Ethnic groups create and transmit vital aspects of cultural 
knowledge and practice including philosophy, literature, music, art, 
food, and language. They also serve as powerful sites for social 
progress, facilitating bonds across individuals and allowing for 
mobilization. Yet ethnic and racial identity also pose deep challenges 
to democracy and the public equality that underlies it. This is in part 
because practices and beliefs differ across groups, and groups 
therefore struggle for power to determine the rules and practices of 
the society in which they live. But this is something of a red herring; 
most people, regardless of ethnicity, share a personal interest in 
safety, security, shelter, protection for civil liberties, and a society in 
which they are respected by their cocitizens. In this section, then, we 
focus on obstacles to public equality that stem not from ethno-racial 
differences but from ethno-racial hierarchies – structures that 
distribute power and advantage to members of some ethnic groups 
and not others.  
 
49 Ethno-racial hierarchies are not natural, but instead are a product of 
historical and current structures established by groups seeking 
domination. These hierarchies are rooted in centuries-old patterns of 
colonialism, conquest, slavery, and/or forced migration. Groups 
identify common traits to bond them together and to justify practices 
that strip those outside the defined group of power. In the United 
States, this pattern began with European settler colonialism over 
Native Americans and chattel slavery of Africans. Although these 
practices came to a formal end, they leave an indelible mark on 
American society. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for 
example, it became increasingly challenging for whites to use legal 
structures to oppress the Native American and Black populations. 
Scientists instead generated theories of “biological differences” 
between races, with whites being “naturally superior” and therefore 
fit to rule over nonwhite inhabitants. This justified stripping these 
inhabitants of rights and liberties, including claims to decent work 
and living conditions. While theories of biological racism have since 
been scientifically debunked, they still hold significant sway, showing 
up explicitly in white nationalist views and more subtly in the widely-
held belief that America is “post-racial” and that differences in 
outcomes between whites and nonwhites can be attributed to 
inherited differences in talent, motivation, and initiative rather than 
systemic barriers and institutionalized racism.  
 
50 From here on out, references to “ethnicity” refer to both race and 
ethnicity. This is because ethnicity is an umbrella term that includes, 
but is not limited to, features associated with race such as skin color, 
hair type, and ancestry (Horowitz 1985). Membership in an ethnic 
group is based upon possessing traits “believed to be associated with 
descent” (Chandran 2006). By “believed to be associated with 
descent,” we mean those traits “around which a credible myth of 
association with descent has been woven, whether or not such an 
association exists in fact” (ibid.). These traits are either genetically 
transmitted (skin color, hair type, physical features) or have to do 
with the language, religion, place of origin, tribe, caste, clan, 
nationality, or race of one’s parents and ancestors (ibid.). It is 
essential to recognize that racial and ethnic categories are not “fixed” 
but rather constructed. The salience of a cluster of “ethnic” features 
thus changes across time and space. Someone with the same 
phenotypically “black” features would encounter different obstacles 
and opportunities in Brazil than they would in France or Kenya. 
Indeed, each society has its own unique history of ethnic and racial 
hierarchy. Recognizing this, we nonetheless strive here to identity 
patterns, frameworks, and interventions that can help policy makers 
and activists worldwide understand the relationship between ethnic 
identity, public equality, and democracy.  
 
51 Across the world, social and economic inequality tracks ethnic 
identity, threatening the underlying substantive equality essential for 
democratic practice. Residential segregation is one of the primary 
drivers of persistent group inequality. Segregation occurs due to 
housing discrimination, minority self-segregation, and patterns 
where families from the dominant ethnic group move away from 
neighborhoods when they become populated by ethnic minority 
groups (Anderson 2010). In Paris, for example, many low-income 
immigrants live in isolated suburban public housing communities. 
They have poor access to public transportation, quality food, good 
schools, and other public goods. They are also socially isolated, which 
means that they rarely interact with white French citizens, at least 
not on terms of respect. This threatens the deliberative component of 
the democratic ideal, decreasing understanding of and empathy for 
people outside one’s ethnic group.  
 
52 Limited interaction breeds stereotypical thinking: if you very rarely 
encounter someone from a minority ethnic group, then your opinions 
about a group are going to be limited to media exposure and a small 
number of personal interactions (ibid.). Stereotyped thinking affects 
everyone in a society, from its lawmakers to its police officers. Biased 
laws, and the biased application of fair laws, significantly impedes 
public equality. Individuals acting on behalf of the state like judges, 
juries, and representatives frequently and unconsciously act in ways 
that deprive citizens of basic rights and liberties. Police officers and 
prosecutors perform one of the most essential tasks in a democracy: 
ensuring internal order. This job is challenging, requiring them to 
make frequent high-stakes decisions about whom to pursue and how. 
Toward this end, officials worldwide use generalizations based on 
race, ethnicity, national origin, instead of evidence or individual 
behavior, as the basis for directing discretionary law enforcement 
actions” (OSJI 2009). This tactic, known as ethnic profiling, leads 
police officers to stop, question, arrest, and detain ethnic minorities at 
disproportionately high rates. In Spain, for example, Romany are ten 
times more likely to be stopped on the street by police than “white” 
residents, Moroccans at 7.5 times the rate of whites, and Black 
Africans at 17 times the rate of whites (García Añón et al. 2013).  
 
53 Despite its popularity, ethnic profiling is both ineffective and unjust. 
Because ethnic minorities are stopped at much higher rates, 
disproportionate number of individuals killed during the pursuit of a 
suspected criminal are from minority groups. In cases where the 
suspect is not killed, the effects of ethnic profiling accumulate: 
disproportionate stops lead to disproportionate arrests, arrests lead 
to prosecutions, prosecutions lead to incarceration, and incarceration 
leads to difficulty finding employment and alienation from one’s 
family and community. In all, the initial act of ethnic profiling in 
policing leads to much higher rates of prosecution and punishment 
for members of ethnic minority groups. This is compounded by the 
fact that juries and judges face severe obstacles to fair evaluation due 
to implicit bias. In some cases, police officers even kill people during 
stops. When this occurs, police officers are not typically held 
accountable, even when the victim was unarmed and not engaged in 
any criminal activity.  
 
54 Given the clear problems associated with ethnic profiling, countries 
across the world are considering legislative and police reforms. First 
and foremost, it is essential that independent bodies are created to 
review officer-involved shootings. States must also build trust 
between police officers and the communities they serve by 
diversifying the population of police officers, conducting workshops 
on implicit bias, and explicitly teaching skills associated with conflict 
mediation and interethnic communication. Another promising reform 
involves officers wearing body cameras that record interactions with 
constituents. When an officer kills a constituent in the line of duty, 
stakeholders in the victim’s community can see the footage and work 
with police to determine whether the officer was reacting 
appropriately given the level of danger at hand.  
 
55 In addition to internal police reforms, there is need for legislation 
banning stops for “furtive” movements such as a reaching for 
waistband or acting nervous, stops for being in a high-crime area, and 
stops for matching a generalized description of a suspect. New York 
City requires officers to report the details of every stop that occurs 
including the location, race and gender of the suspect, whether force 
was used, and whether a firearm was found. This has led to a sharp 
decrease in baseless stops. Finally, policy makers could decriminalize 
activities that do not threaten public security but give police officers 
easy justifications for stopping someone, including public alcohol 
consumption, marijuana possession, loitering, spitting, and 
jaywalking.  
 
56 While these legislative and institutional reforms are essential to 
ending ethnic profiling, unfair policing is a symptom of larger societal 
problems that must be addressed, including the fact that public goods 
like education, safe roads, electricity, healthcare, and police 
protection are distributed unequally along ethnic lines. Unequal 
public goods provision is partially explained by opportunity and 
resource hoarding – a group with existing power and resources 
benefits from limiting access to these goods. Social scientists have 
found that cities with higher levels of ethnic diversity spend less 
overall on public goods (Alesina, Bagir, and Easterly 1999). This is 
because wealth levels map to an ethno-racial hierarchy, with certain 
ethnic groups possessing more wealth than others. In-group hoarding 
occurs when there are disparities in wealth along ethnic lines because 
well-resourced groups have more to lose, and poor individuals have 
more to gain from redistribution (Baldwin and Huber 2016). What’s 
more, wealthy individuals are better able to substitute private goods 
for public goods (purchasing private education, private security, etc.), 
making them less sensitive to the levels of overall public goods 
provision. Consider the distribution of a public good – physical 
security – in Brazil. During the past decade, the murder rate for white 
citizens has decreased by 24 percent while the murder rate for Black 
and mixed-race citizens has increased by 40 percent. This is because 
white rich citizens are able to purchase private security, which both 
increases their safety and decreases their motivation to fund public 
security in the form of policing for others.  
 
57 Political parties frequently mobilize voters alone ethnic lines, 
explicitly promoting ideologies that play up “inherent” differences 
between ethnic groups. In the United States, for example, Black 
Americans are twice as likely to be unemployed and nearly three 
times as likely to live in poverty. Based on this, and drawing on 
centuries of bigoted stereotypes, white politicians often cast African-
Americans as “lazy” and “lacking work ethic.” The reality is that 
African-Americans cannot access jobs due to poor access to 
education, employment discrimination, and other forms of 
oppression that result from the unequal distribution of public goods. 
To the extent that African-Americans are out of work, this is because 
whites “tend to limit access to stable jobs to fellow whites, relegating 
blacks to temporary, part-time, or marginal jobs in the secondary 
labor market” (Anderson 2010). In short, political ideologies that play 
up “inherent” differences between ethnic groups “misrepresent the 
effect of group inequality as its cause” (ibid.).  
 
58 Spatial segregation and unequal public goods provision undermine 
the substantive elements required for citizens to deliberate and 
determine the law as equals. Toward this end, spending on public 
schools ought to be equalized across ethnic groups, or in some cases 
even increased given the high need for supplemental “wrap-around” 
services like counseling, food, special education, and school supplies 
in high-poverty areas. Yet improving primary and secondary 
education is not a silver bullet; these efforts must be accompanied by 
steps to end residential segregation and increased spending on other 
public goods like childcare, paid family leave policies, healthcare, 
adult job training and employment, and access to nutritious food.  
 
59 There is a tight relationship between the substantive and procedural 
conditions of public equality. Equal participation requires voter 
mobilization, campaigning, and lobbying financial capital, political 
knowledge, time, and access, which members of these groups 
frequently lack for the reasons described. As a result, they are less 
able to deliberate with fellow citizens on an equal footing. As was 
made clear earlier in this chapter, it is therefore urgent to put in place 
campaign finance laws distributing political resources across groups 
and limiting the influence of existing private wealth. Additionally, 
close attention must be paid to the interaction between existing 
ethnic hierarchy and democratic procedures. Direct democratic 
measures are on the rise in modern democracies. These practices that 
allow citizens to propose and vote directly on measures, are 
appealing to democratic theorists because they foster grassroots 
organizing, ensure numerical voting equality on issues, and allow 
those without powerful ties to politicians to have their voices heard. 
Yet careful attention to the empirical effects of these practices 
highlights how substantive inequalities and biases may infect 
democratic procedures. Voters bring in their own stereotyped beliefs 
and biases to the booth, which can result in a tyranny of the majority 
at the expense of minority groups.  
 
60 In Switzerland, for example, foreign residents become naturalized in 
three stages: vetted first by the federal government, then the state, 
then at the municipal level. While some municipalities have elected 
politicians vote on the applications, others allow voters to decide 
directly via secret ballot. A recent study found that, between 1970 
and 2003, foreign residents were 50 percent more likely to get 
naturalized when elected politicians made the decision rather than 
voters (Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Lawrence 2016). The quality of 
the applicant pool was the same across districts, implying that voters 
discriminate against qualified applicants that would have been 
approved if accountable legislators had made the decision. In fact, the 
effect of switching from direct to representative democracy was 
notably stronger in areas where citizens were more xenophobic 
(ibid.). This is because representatives, even if they hold the same 
prejudices as the voters, are publicly accountable for their choices 
and know their decisions are subject to evaluation in the courts. In 
short, under certain circumstances, direct democratic measures can 
be used to suppress the legitimate interests of ethnic minorities. 
Therefore, policy makers should be attentive to the circumstances 
under which ballot referenda are used, particularly when it comes to 
decisions concerning citizenship and the distribution of public goods.  
 
61 Ethnic hierarchy poses a substantial threat public equality. One’s 
membership in an ethnic group often determines whether one can 
access basic civil rights and liberties as well as the goods and 
resources essential for discourse on terms of mutual respect. This, in 
turn, poses clear challenges to democracy as a process of decision 
making in which people have an equal ability to determine the laws 
and norms that bind them. 
 
62 Religious inequality 
 
63 The defining feature of democracy, as already expressed in the 
introduction, is that all groups and persons be recognized as equally 
valued members of the society to which they belong. If this is so, and 
if, further, the collective decision-making process is the public 
realization of the equal worth of every citizen, then any practice that 
involves discrimination, exclusion, marginalization or oppression of 
groups and persons violates the principle of democracy. For our 
purpose here, inequality may be viewed as a condition where such 
exclusionary and/or discriminatory practices thrive, where power is 
illegitimately deployed to thwart the basis interests and values of 
individuals and groups. A fully realized democracy then cannot 
coexist with inequality.  
 
64 The focus of this section is on one such type of inequality namely: 
religious inequality. Religious inequality can be of two kinds. In a 
society with multiple religions, members of one religious group may 
treat members of other religious groups as unequals, as when a 
government controlled by non-Muslims refuses permission to build a 
mosque with minarets, or when Hindus and Christians are debarred 
from standing for public office in an Islamic state. Let this be called 
interreligious inequality. A second kind of religious inequality also 
persists in many societies. Consider the persecution of Catholics by 
Protestants or the de-recognition of Ahmadiyas as Muslims. Here 
members of a broadly conceived religious group treat their own 
members as unequals. Let this be called intrareligious inequality. 
Another deeper form of intrareligious inequality also exists. For 
example, in India a whole group of people, formerly called “the 
untouchables” continue to find it difficult to enter many Hindu 
temples; in some places, women are still hounded because they are 
believed to be witches, women between the ages of fifteen and fifty-
five are not allowed entry into a temple because they are 
menstruating and therefore believed to be polluted.  
 
65 The question before us is how should states deal with these different 
forms of religious inequalities. Are democratic states in a better 
position to address such inequalities than nondemocratic states? 
Furthermore, are some forms of democratic states better equipped to 
deal with religious inequalities than others? While the distinction 
between democratic and nondemocratic states is important, an even 
more important distinction for our purpose is between religion-
centered and secular states. It is our view that all religion-centered 
states perpetuate religious inequalities and violate important 
principles of democracy. If the reduction of religious inequalities is 
our objective, then, it is argued here, religion-centered states must 
give way to secular states. Only secular democratic state can 
undermine religious inequalities. But this simple answer does not 
suffice because all forms of secular-democratic states are not equally 
capable of addressing religious inequality. This begs the question: 
which form of secular-democratic state is best able to reduce both 
intra- and interreligious inequalities? To answer this question is the 
central objective of this section.  
 
66 What are religion-centered and secular states? Religion-centered 
states grant privileged recognition to any one religion. They promote 
the values and interests of that religion and justify most of their laws 
and policies in terms of these values or interests. Sometimes, entire 
apparatus of such states is run by religious personnel. The connection 
of states with religion is so strong and constitutive that their very 
identity is defined by religion. Such states then are Christian, Islamic 
or Hindu.  
 
67 Secular states are different. They withdraw privileges that any 
established religion had previously taken for granted. This they can 
do only when their primary ends or goals are defined independently 
of religion. Thus, a crucial requirement of a secular state is that it has 
no constitutive links with religion, that the ends of any religion not be 
installed as the ends of the state. For example, it cannot be the 
constitutive objective of the state to ensure salvation, nirvana, or 
moksha. No religious community in such a state can say that the state 
belongs exclusively to it. The identity of the state is defined 
independently of religion, and certainly independently of any one 
religion. Furthermore, laws and policies of such states cannot be 
justified solely in terms of reasons provided by any one religion.  
 
68 Which of the two, religion-centered or secular states can better 
undermine religious inequalities and build an inclusive society and 
polity on fair and equal terms? A cursory evaluation of these states 
shows that all religion-centered states are deeply troublesome. Take 
first historical instances of states that establish a single church, the 
unreformed established Protestant Churches of England, Scotland 
and Germany, and the Catholic Churches in Italy and Spain. These 
states recognized a particular version enunciated by the church as the 
official religion, compelled individuals to congregate for only one 
church, punished them for failing to profess a particular set of 
religious beliefs, and levied taxes in support of one particular church 
(Levy 1994, 5). In such cases, not only was there inequality among 
religions (for example between Christians and Jews) but also among 
the churches of the same religion. Such multireligious or multiple-
denominational societies were frequently wrecked by interreligious 
or interdenominational wars and if not, their religious minorities 
faced persistent religious persecution (Jews in several European 
countries till the nineteenth century).  
 
69 States with substantive establishments have not changed color with 
time. Wherever one religion is not only formally but substantively 
established, the persecution of minorities and internal dissenters 
continues today. One has only to cite the example of Saudi Arabia to 
prove this point (Ruthven 2002, 172-81). Or consider the situation in 
Pakistan where the virtual establishment of the dominant Sunni sect 
has proved to be disastrous to minorities, including to Muslim 
minorities. For example, Ahmedis have been deemed a non-Muslim 
minority, forbidden from using Islamic nomenclature in their 
religious and social lives (Malik 2002, 10; Bhargava 2010, 63-108; 
2010a, 81-102); and has been formally excluded by the state, both 
symbolically and materially, from its own religion. Moreover, by 
making adherence to Islam mandatory for anyone aspiring to the 
highest offices in the country, the Constitution ensures the exclusion 
of religious minorities from high politics (Malik 2002, 16). Likewise, 
many people in India believe that the establishment of a Hindu 
Rashtra would be disastrous, particularly for Muslim minorities, 
perhaps even for the Dalits (former untouchables). The Jewish state 
of Israel in effect fails to grant equal rights to its religious minorities.  
 
70 So if religious inequalities are to be reduced, religion-centered states 
must be dismantled. However, while secular democratic states are 
committed to equality of citizenship, they also differ from one another 
in their respective understandings of how they must relate to religion. 
All agree that they must be separated or disconnected, but differ on 
how the metaphor of separation is to be unpacked. For one, 
separation is total disconnection or mutual exclusion. The state has 
neither a positive relationship with religion, for example there is no 
policy of granting aid to religious institutions nor a negative 
relationship with it; it is not within the scope of state activity to 
interfere in religious matters. The Constitutional state of the United 
States is frequently interpreted to instantiate this model, advocating 
mutual exclusion of state and religion (a wall) primarily for the sake 
of religious liberty and denominational pluralism. Thus by protecting 
religious freedom of all groups and ensuring interdenominational 
equality as also by ruling out discrimination in the official domain on 
grounds of religion, this model prevents certain forms of religious 
inequalities. However, it has two major limitations: (a) By its refusal 
to negatively intervene in religious practices, it may allow 
discriminatory, oppressive practices within a religion; (b) by 
eschewing any positive help to all religious groups, it may overlook, 
to achieve equality, some vulnerable religious minorities require 
assistance from the state.  
 71 In another, second type, disconnection is partial and is conceived at 
the level of law and public policy in a wholly one-sided manner. Here 
to disconnect is to exclude religion from the affairs of the state but to 
allow virtually limitless intervention by the state in the affairs of 
religion to control, regulate and even to destroy religion. Such secular 
states are decidedly antireligious. They often advocate one sided 
exclusion primarily for the sake of a stringently guarded common 
public culture that gives a uniform and equal identity to citizens. In 
their authoritarian form this model is at least partly exemplified in 
Kemalist Turkey and Soviet Russia. Its democratic version is best 
enunciated in France.  
 
72 These secular states ( model 2) have one advantage over model 1. 
Since they are willing to intervene in religious affairs, they can 
undercut oppressive and exclusionary religious practices and achieve 
some forms of interreligious equality. However by refusing to grant 
positive recognition or financial aid particularly to newly immigrated 
religious groups and by their obstinate refusal to acknowledge the 
entanglement of both official and public practices with a historically 
embedded majority religion, they at least unwittingly perpetuate 
interreligious inequality.  
 
73 Partial disconnection is also the form of state-religion relationship in 
the third (model 3) type of secular-democratic state. Disconnection is 
partial here because the state continues to partially support one 
religion, usually the dominant one, on the ground that it is part of 
cultural inheritance and historical legacy of its citizens and therefore 
a significant public good. Such states are found in large parts of 
Western Europe. Such secular-democratic states, though not religion-
centered, remain single religion-friendly. Why, if they provide to 
support to one religion, are such states secular?  
 
74 There are several reasons for this. First, (a) because of a historical 
pattern of hostility to church and church-based religions on the 
ground that they were politically meddlesome and socially oppressive 
– a pattern explicit in the unchurching struggles in France but also 
found in most West European countries; (b) second, over time there 
has over time been a decline both in church belonging and in 
doctrinal adherence. Surely, if there is one place where secular 
humanism is perhaps naïvely taken for granted as the only 
ontological and epistemological game in town, it is Western Europe! 
Both (a) and (b) have had an impact on Europe’s constitutional 
regimes. A fair degree of disconnection exists at the levels of ends, 
and so the same basket of formal rights (to different kinds of liberty, 
and forms of equality, etc.) are offered to all individuals regardless of 
their church affiliation and regardless of whether they are or are not 
religious. In the dominant political discourse, the self-definition of 
these states is that they are not religious (Christian) but (purely) 
liberal democratic.  
 
75 However, it is equally true that some connection exists between state 
and religion. Several states continue to grant monopolistic privileges 
to one or the other branch of Christianity (The Presbyterian Church in 
Scotland, the Lutheran Church in most Nordic countries, the Orthodox 
Church in Greece, the Anglican Church in England). Moreover, at the 
level of law and public policy, state intervention exists in the form of 
support for the dominant church/churches. Thus though no longer 
religion-centered, they remain single-religion friendly states. State-
religion connections combined with a significant degree of 
disconnection mean that these democratic states are at best modestly 
secular by the standards set by the idealized American model or the 
French model (Tariq Modood).  
 
76 How do states of Western Europe fare when evaluated by norms of 
religious equality? Not all that well, it seems. Blind to the more 
complex dimension of interreligious inequalities, they do not even see 
that in this dimension they are not secular. Despite all changes, 
European states have continued to privilege Christianity in one form 
or another. The liberal democratization and the consequent 
secularization of many European states have helped citizens with 
non-Christian faiths to acquire most formal rights. But such a scheme 
of rights neither embodies a regime of interreligious equality nor 
effectively prevents religion-based discrimination and exclusion. 
Indeed, it masks majoritarian, ethno-religious biases. Thus, to go back 
to the example of schools run by religious communities, only two to 
five schools run by Muslims are provided state funding in England. In 
France there is at least one state-funded Muslim school (in Réunion), 
and about four or five new private Muslim schools that are in the 
process of signing “contrats d’association” with the state. In Germany 
not a single school run by Muslims is funded by the state. Other 
examples exist in the failure of many Western European states to deal 
with the issue of headscarves (most notably France), in unheeded 
demands by Muslims to build mosques (Germany and Italy), in 
discrimination against ritual slaughter (Germany), and in unheeded 
demands by Muslims for proper burial grounds of their own 
(Denmark, among others).  
 
77 So, do forms or conceptions of secular-democratic states that better 
address religious inequalities exist? One particular model outside the 
West (in the Indian subcontinent) that has tried, often unsuccessfully, 
to eliminate deep religious inequalities, and which currently lies in 
shambles everywhere, needs careful attention.  
 
78 Several features of this fourth kind of secular-democratic state are 
worth mentioning. First, multiple religions exist in their background 
not as optional extras added on as an afterthought but as part of its 
foundation. These secular democratic states are inextricably tied to 
deep religious diversity. Second, they are committed to deeply 
diverse set of values, not only liberty and equality but also fraternity 
(or sociability) – conceived not narrowly as pertaining only to 
individuals but interpreted broadly also to cover the relative 
autonomy of religious communities and, in limited and specific 
domains, their equality of status in society – as well as other to foster 
a certain quality of relations among religious communities, perhaps 
even interreligious equality under conditions of deep religious 
diversity. They have a place not only for the right of individuals to 
profess their religious beliefs but also for the right of religious 
communities to, say, establish and maintain educational institutions 
crucial for the survival and sustenance of their distinctive religious 
traditions.  
 
79 The acceptance of community-specific rights brings me to the third 
feature of this model. Because this form of secular democratic state 
was born in a deeply multireligious society, it is concerned as much 
with interreligious inequality as it is with intrareligious inequality. 
Whereas other secular democratic states appear to provide benefits 
to minority religious groups only incidentally (e.g., Jews benefited in 
some European countries such as France not because their special 
needs and demands were met via public recognition but because of a 
more general restructuring of society guided by an individual-based 
emancipatory agenda), in these states some community-specific 
sociocultural rights are granted for their intrinsic value.  
 
80 Fourth, such secular democratic states do not erect a wall of 
separation between religion and state. There are boundaries, of 
course, but they are porous. This situation allows the state to 
intervene in religions in order to help or hinder them without the 
impulse to control or destroy them. This intervention can include 
granting aid to educational institutions of religious communities on a 
non-preferential basis and interfering in socio-religious institutions 
that deny equal dignity and status to members of their own religion 
or to those of others; for example, the ban on untouchability and the 
obligation to allow everyone, irrespective of their caste, to enter 
Hindu temples, as well as, potentially, other actions to correct gender 
inequalities. In short, this form of secular democratic state interprets 
separation to mean not strict exclusion or strict neutrality, but what I 
call principled distance, poles apart from one-sided exclusion or 
mutual exclusion.  
 
81 What does principled distance mean? First, religious groups have 
sought exemptions when states have intervened in religious practices 
by promulgating laws designed to apply neutrally across society. For 
example, Sikhs demand exemptions from mandatory helmet laws to 
accommodate religiously required turbans. Principled distance allows 
a practice that is banned or regulated in the majority culture to be 
permitted in the minority culture because of the distinctive status and 
meaning it has for the minority culture’s members. Religious groups 
may demand that the state refrain from interference in their 
practices, but they may equally demand that the state interfere in 
such a way as to give them special assistance so that they are able to 
secure what other groups are routinely able to acquire by virtue of 
their social dominance in the political community. For example, 
subsidies are provided to schools run by all religious communities. 
Some holidays of all religious communities are granted national 
status.  
 
82 Moreover, principled distance allows state intervention in some 
religions more than in others. Minority religions are granted a 
constitutional right to establish and maintain their educational 
institutions. Limited funding may be available to Muslims for Hajj. 
State engagement can also take a negative interventionist form. For 
the promotion of equality, special measure may be required in one 
religion. To undermining caste hierarchies, Hindu temples in India 
were thrown open to all, particularly to former untouchables should 
they choose to enter them. Likewise, constitutionally it is possible to 
undertake gender-based reforms in Hindu or personal Muslim 
personal law.  
 
83 Fifth, such states are not compelled to choose between active hostility 
and passive indifference or between disrespectful hostility and 
respectful indifference toward religion. They combine the two, 
permitting necessary hostility as long as there is also active respect. 
This is a complex dialectical attitude to religion that I have called 
critical respect. So, on the one hand, the state protects all religions, 
makes them feel equally at home, especially vulnerable religious 
communities, by granting them community-specific rights. But the 
state also hits hard at religion-based oppression, exclusion, and 
discrimination, in short all forms of religious inequalities.  
 84 This section has argued that secular-democratic states of the 
principled distance variety have a better chance of reducing religious 
inequalities. In sum, a society progresses the more it moves away 
from (a) a religion-centered to a secular-democratic state and (b) 
secular-democratic states hostile or aloof from religions generally or 
friendly exclusively to one religion to those that keep a principled 
distance from all religions.  
 
85 Gender inequality 
 
86 Gender equality is a Mission Impossible, now more than ever. First, 
there is an ongoing perpetuum mobile of gender inequality that is 
driven by structures and daily actions of human beings across all 
walks of life. Second, gender equality as an objective is deeply 
political and inherently contested. Finally, while deep democracy is 
needed to mobilize and organize the inevitable ongoing feminist 
struggles against the tenacity and complexity of gender inequality, 
democracy currently seems to be shrinking rather than deepening 
and strengthening.  
 
87 These triple troubles call for more attention to the linkages between 
the fates of democracy and of gender equality, and for more feminist 
engagement in struggles for deeper democracy. This means more 
attention for the pervasiveness and the tenacity of gender inequality 
in our societies, for the political nature of gender equality as a goal, 
and for a clearer perspective on democracy that shows the 
interrelation between gender equality and democracy. Given the 
current fate of democracy in Europe, this section will end with a call 
for action.  
 
88 The pervasiveness and the tenacity of gender inequality in our societies 
 
89 Even the briefest look at feminist history shows how significant 
victories in the past have never been enough to end gender 
inequality. Women’s access to higher education, their legal 
personhood, women’s suffrage, all these hard-won long battles by 
brave and engaged feminists have not brought an end to male 
domination. If anything, they have revealed the tenacity and 
complexity of gender inequality regimes. Gender inequality regimes 
have proven very flexible in readapting to changed contexts and 
structures. Laws and formal governmental regulations have not 
changed reality as intended. Progress is made, but mostly partial and 
never ensured. The impact of ongoing gender inequality on people’s 
lives is huge, given that gender inequality restricts the lives of both 
women and men that do not fit well into conventional gender norms.  
 
90 We now know something about the reasons why progress is so slow. 
The tenacity and complexity of gender inequality regimes is caused 
by the multilevel and multidimensional character of gender, its 
location in all social domains, and its deep connections to other 
inequalities. As the world is deeply social, none of this is fixed, and 
everything is in flux. The multilevel character of gender means that 
gender is part of societal structures and organizations, symbols and 
norms, identities and behavior. Identities, personalities, routinized 
behavior, symbols, norms and structures are made and remade on a 
daily basis by the human beings on this planet. They make conscious 
decisions about this gendered world and their positioning in it, but 
also often just routinely follow the gendered scripts that history 
provides. It is hard to think of a domain where these gendered tracks 
or scripts would be absent. Gender inequality is both public and 
private, and is crucial to constructing what is seen as public and what 
is seen as private (similar to sexual inequality). Whether in economy, 
polity, violence, health or knowledge, the gender unequal 
configurations of the past offer the material that people use to make 
their lives, provide the words and signs people use to be accepted and 
understood by others. In doing so, people reproduce and to some 
degree reorganize these gendered tracks, these gendered words, this 
gendered world across all domains. Whether people benefit or suffer 
from it depends on their gendered locations (men, women or 
nonbinary).  
 
 
 91 Feminist collective action – focused political pressure to change an 
element of these inequality regimes – such as quotas in politics, a 
more permissive abortion law, father’s leave or the opening of 
shelters for domestic violence victims, aims at change, and their hard-
won victories matter. They are small steps with tremendous impact 
on the lives of some women (and men). Yet, there are intersectional 
caveats to most victories: not all women, not all men equally benefit 
from them. Quotas in politics might be opening space mostly for high 
educated women, access to abortion might be almost impossible for 
rural women, gay fathers may not be eligible for paternity leave, 
minority women victims of domestic violence might have good reason 
not to engage with shelters organized by social workers for fear of 
being stigmatized in their communities or having custody of their 
children taken away from them.  
 
92 It is clear then that it is very hard to fundamentally change the 
dynamics of gender inequality, or to abolish gender inequality. 
Collective action’s role in inducing and supporting change is well 
demonstrated. But what are the conditions that foster such actions? 
What makes feminist collective action successful? How to ensure that 
these are victories for all women? To answer to these questions, the 
quality of democracy is key. The quality of democracy matters for 
gender equality because the tenacity of gender inequality in our 
societies calls for better conditions for feminist collective action, and 
such action can only thrive in democracies. This is a matter of both 
theory and practice, of both a better understanding of the politics 
needed and more engagement to make such politics happen.  
 
93 The political nature of gender equality as a goal 
 
94 If anyone should know what gender equality is, feminists should. And 
they do indeed, each and every one of them. Yet they give very 
different meanings to these goals, contradictory meanings even, 
including objections to the wording used here. Feminists fight fiercely 
about what the goal of feminism needs to be even if there are many 
examples of large-scale collective feminist actions for an agreed upon 
feminist cause. To make progress on how to deal with the challenge of 
the multitude of feminist goals – the challenge of the deep political 
nature of the feminist goal – two questions need to be addressed: 
What exactly are the bones of contention? Where do hegemonic 
understandings of gender equality come from? Intersectionality is key 
to address these questions because history shows, over and over 
again, that intersectional inequalities and the political choices that 
need to be made about them occupy center stage in internal feminist 
struggles and in the outcomes of these struggles. The intersection of 
class and gender was a bone of contention when feminists were 
fighting for the suffrage in Europe; the intersection of race and gender 
was at the heart of suffrage dynamics in the United States. In both 
Europe and the United States, sexual orientation deeply divided the 
feminist movement in the 1970s, and current conflicts over 
transrights are equally divisive. At the level of feminist ideology and 
feminist theory, one of the strongest divides runs between liberal 
feminism – aiming for a gender equal society within the settings of a 
capitalist world –, and socialist feminism – aiming for a gender equal 
society in which capitalist exploitation is abolished or at least tamed. 
There is no way gender inequality can be understood or addressed 
separately from other major inequalities built around class, sexuality 
and race.  
 
95 This political nature of gender equality cannot be escaped, and the 
ongoing struggle of feminists and others about the meaning of gender 
equality is essential. Such “productive antagonism” (Butler 1993) or 
refusal of “ultimate truths” (Scott, J. W. 1988) produces a dynamic 
understanding of feminism that can address the moving target of 
gender inequality by adapting to its changing forms, and that enables 
wider sets of coalitions to profit from emerging political 
opportunities. The format of ongoing struggle enables feminism to 
challenge domination as well as unstated “norms” of dominant groups 
within itself, to uncover and address processes of hegemonisation 
within the feminist project (Hooks 1981). Open spaces and explicit 
rules are needed to include the perspectives of previously excluded 
subjects, ensuring that new inequalities are not made. For all the 
reasons stated, feminism as a political project needs democracy.  
 
96 Democracy and its interrelation with gender equality 
 
97 Gender inequality as a political problem, and gender equality as a 
political goal are too dynamic to fit comfortably within classic formats 
of formal electoral representation. Formal representation and formal 
political actors, because of their acceptance of the boundaries of a 
certain nation or state, do not work well for giving voice to the 
nonrepresented, or for contributing to the articulation of political 
problems by those who are in one way or another not fully included 
in our societies. Social movements are the main actors that can 
introduce new actors to politics; that can develop and introduce new 
political problems to societies, and pursue political change to address 
these problems. For social movements to do this well, how citizenship 
is organized is key: who are included and excluded in societies, and 
who decides on this? Some degree of voice, of inclusive citizenship is 
needed for social movements to emerge and flourish. A first problem 
is that formal citizenship rights do not fully translate into actual 
access to participation in democratic institutions. The documented 
list of barriers for women in politics is long, ranging from non-
inclusive language, to ridicule, absence of role models, biased 
electoral systems, problematic access to campaign funding, lack of 
compliance with formal rules or outright harassment. Additionally, 
there are many human beings who are located at the intersection of 
gender and other inequalities and who lack basic rights in 
democracies as we know them. Consider the lack of bodily autonomy 
for women from states without abortion or contraception rights, the 
lack of resources for many women given the persisting wage gap, the 
lack of access to family rights for many lesbian and gay parents, the 
lack of freedom of movement for trans citizens from states without 
full trans rights, the lack of economic rights for asylum seekers in 
states that forbid them to be active on the labor market. Moreover, in 
order to really function as a democracy, a society needs to organize 
space not only for its subaltern groups, but also for disruptors of its 
way of functioning: for people who remind everyone that the political 
landscape does not cover all of society’s problems, the political stage 
does not show all the actors actually involved in society, and change is 
needed to address newly politicized problems.  
 
98 What kind of democracy does feminism – the political project that is 
home to feminist social movements – need? Authors such as Walby 
(2009) and Tilly (2007), show the need to expand on the classic 
procedural rules of electoral democracy with wider rules on 
citizenship and attention to the practices and outcomes those sets of 
rules produce in a society. The wider rules are non-exclusionary rules 
on citizenship that define how political arenas for debate and struggle 
are constructed (who is part of the demos), facilitate engagement of 
people in the societies relevant to them, and construct links between 
civil society and formal politics, thereby increasing the possibilities 
for democratic engagement toward gender equality. Following Tilly, 
state capacity is a crucial ingredient of democracy too, as it is 
essential to assure democratic practices. Including the practices and 
outcomes and not just the classic formal rules is also essential 
because of feedback effects between rules and outcomes.  
 
99 Current troubles with democracy in Europe 
 
100 Along with ongoing problems of democracy unrecognized by most 
political scientists, such as “democratic” states that are 
simultaneously monarchies or colonial powers, or have rules allowing 
parties to be ruled autocratically, there are substantial problems for 
democracy hindering further progress in abolishing gender 
inequality, as the following examples from the wider Europe 
illustrate. There is the intrusion of the domain of the economy in the 
domain of the polity, visible in the failure of democracies to constrain 
financial capitalism, the tendency to allow businesses to financially 
opt out of democratic decisions (TTIP), and the contagious spread of 
business reasoning in governance (as in NPM). All this weakens 
democracy, and expands the possibilities for gendered capitalist 
exploitation by either restricting welfare state arrangements or 
increasing the possibilities for precarious labor. Moreover, there is a 
renewed strengthening of the political power of organized religion as 
part of the polity, which is a major source of opposition to gender and 
sexual equality. While public attention centers mostly on Islamist 
states, the Vatican and Orthodox churches are much more important 
in the European context. There is also a rise of authoritarianism that is 
visible in the strengthening of the Radical Right and its connection to 
authoritarian style geopolitics. There is a rise in illiberalism and 
populism, including criticism on independent thinking and on 
collective action. There are increasing calls for political restriction to 
academic autonomy (Turkey, Hungary), and laws that “gag” civil 
society in European Union member states (Spain, Hungary). Across 
European countries, there are increasing (calls for) restrictions on 
citizenship based on racialized features (religion, origin) across 
European countries. And there is an increase in sham democracies: 
mafia states adopting democratic masks to stage the theatre of their 
coercive power conquests. In sum, democratic structures supportive 
of women’s rights – such as social democracy, welfare, civil society 
engagement and academic freedom – are being eroded, with 
opposition to gender and sexual equality growing in frequency and 
strength (Verloo 2017).  
 
101 Intersectional challenges for democratic struggles about gender 
equality 
 
102 Under conditions of endangered democracy, groups of women at the 
intersection of gender and sexuality, gender and class, and gender 
and race already encounter severe backlashes and further exclusion. 
Even for more privileged women, there is an urgent need for more 
wage equality and political representation, and less gender-based 
violence. But the challenges for various intersectional groups of 
women are far more substantial. The rise of authoritarianism and the 
extreme right in Europe increases the salience of certain inequality 
projects in politics and hinders working toward more gender, sexual 
and racial inequality. Within conservative and extreme right political 
ideologies, heteronormativity and traditional perspectives on gender 
prevail, with a center piece on fertility in the national interest. Sexual 
equality is almost always opposed and that impacts negatively on 
gender equality. The far right’s rise to power has set in motion 
backlashes against reproductive rights and has diminished hopes for 
such rights in countries lacking them. Racial inequality is at the heart 
of most far right ideologies and proposed actions, constructing 
“racialized others” based on changing contextual configurations of 
skin color, religion (especially Judaism and Islam), origin (migration) 
or language. These variations in racialization complicate collective 
action against it. Class inequality is on the rise, linked to austerity 
measures leading to the weakening of welfare states in Europe. The 
weakening of social democratic parties, combined with their 
traditional blind spot for gendered class inequalities, seriously 
hinders action to reduce gendered class inequalities.  
 
103 Strategically, the authoritarian preferences of far-right and populist 
parties strengthen the tendency to decrease the space given to civil 
society, further hindering collective action toward gender equality. 
The tendency for civil society restriction is exacerbated by the 
current terrorist attacks in Europe that trigger political responses 
that restrict civil liberties. In such contexts, it seems almost utopian to 
consider giving political space to the subaltern.  
 
104 Summarizing, while a high need exists for more political engagement 
with gender equality, intersectional challenges to gender equality 
mean current developments all point to fewer opportunities to do so.  
 
105 Gender equality and democracy are linked in an intricate and 
reinforcing feedback loop. The more democracy, the more chances for 
gender equality; the more gender equality there is, the more chances 
for democracy. Because of their interdependence, we need to be as 
clear and specific as possible about what kind of democratic 
principles and practices are needed to achieve real gender equality. 
As a set of principles, practices and outcomes guiding, organizing and 
producing the polity and civil society, democracy is utopian but the 
only hope for achieving real gender equality. 
 106 Generational inequalities 
 
107 There are at least three forms of generational inequalities that may 
constitute a challenge for the goal of democratic equality: (1) 
inequalities between non-overlapping generations; (2) inequalities 
between coexisting birth cohorts; and (3) inequalities between age 
groups. These three forms of generational inequalities will be the 
focus of the sections that follow.  
 
108 The challenge of justice between non-overlapping generations 
 
109 Our unsustainable use of natural resources has created large 
problems that future generations will have to tackle. Deforestation, 
overfishing and pollution have had a tremendous impact on 
biodiversity. The future is bleak with expected frequent natural 
catastrophes as a result of climate change. Some populations will be 
hit harder than others and, as entire territories will inevitably be 
replaced by water, millions will be forced to migrate. As a result, it is 
becoming more and more likely that future generations will have 
difficulties accessing the resources they need, including food, water 
and clean air.  
 
110 The environmental crisis and its myriads of consequences result in 
large part from the incapacity of present democratic institutions to 
reverse, stop, or at least stabilize climate change, global warming and 
their various consequences. It epitomizes an endemic short-termism 
in democratic politics, and gives us the suspicion that our political 
institutions may not adequately promote long-term interests, in 
general, and the interests of future generations, in particular.  
 
111 We face fundamental challenges such as global poverty that demand 
the urgent use of some non-renewable resources. But those 
important interests need to be balanced with those of future people. 
And yet, it is fair to worry that the fundamental inequality in power 
and representation of interests between current and future 
generations has translated into a radical form of political inequality. 
There are at least two ways in which this inequality is challenging 
from the point of view of democratic equality: one is procedural and 
the other is substantive.  
 
112 First, in order for our decisions to have long-term procedural 
legitimacy, largely regardless of their actual content, adequate weight 
must be given to the interests of future generations. Even though in 
theory we can grant that their life and interests matter as much as 
ours do, it is not easy to ensure that they enjoy some presence in 
representative and deliberative bodies. It is even harder to make sure 
their interests are accounted for in voting procedures. But with the 
increasing realization that we are harming future generations, we 
ought to develop imaginative mechanisms that ensure future people 
have some form of voice.  
 
113 More controversially, the second challenge is substantive. It relates to 
the content of the policies that our democratic systems generate. 
Intergenerational justice requires at the very least that we make 
decisions that are sustainable. This goal of sustainability through time 
applies to other domains than the environment. It has implications 
for the levels of debt we are entitled to pass on to future generations, 
for the public infrastructure we invest in, for the budget we must 
devote to research, and for the extent to which we must protect 
heritage.  
 
114 Sustainability is a substantive requirement of intergenerational 
justice, but also a demand of democratic equality. Indeed, the 
environmental crisis threatens the basic subsistence and, in fact, the 
very existence of future generations. Future generations have a 
higher stake than current people in the long-term detrimental effects 
of current political decisions. If those interests are sidelined, then the 
basic foundations of the democratic ideal – that each person’s 
interests matter equally, and that each person’s basic liberties cannot 
be disregarded – are undermined. Therefore, the second challenge of 
intergenerational inequalities for democratic equality is substantive: 
to entrench the ideal of sustainability in democratic institutions.  
 115 We can distinguish at least four types of mechanisms that respond to 
the challenges that come from the structural invisibility of future 
generations. First, some institutions give a political voice to future 
generations. The introduction of parliamentary commissioners for 
future generations (like in Hungary) and the proposal for an 
International Ombudsperson for Future Generations are two such 
mechanisms. Another promising proposal is a committee for future 
generations in parliaments (like in Finland), whose role would be to 
scrutinize all policies from the perspective of future interests. Second, 
independent institutions that monitor progresses are proposed – for 
instance, an independent Council for the Future to complement 
parliamentary commissions. A third and fourth type of mechanisms 
consists in the constitutional entrenchment of intergenerational 
provisions and the implementation of institutions that directly 
promote a more sustainable future. The latter contributes to what we 
have identified as the substantive demand of democratic equality for 
future generations. From the proposal of a world climate bank, to the 
use of sovereign wealth funds with an individual dividend to give a 
stake to citizens in environmental management, those reforms can 
help bring about more sustainability in the management of 
nonrenewable resources.1  
 
116 Inequalities between birth cohorts 
 
117 In addition to the general anxiety about the kind of future that we 
may leave to future generations, there is a growing concern for a lost 
generation – a large mass of young adults burdened with debts, 
structural unemployment and precarious work. This concern has 
been particularly stark in European countries struggling with high 
rates of youth unemployment, as high as 50 percent in Greece and 
Spain, but often two to four times as high as for older age groups in 
other European countries. High rates of unemployment at a young 
age scar people in the long run and make them more likely to be 
unemployed or underpaid later in life compared to other cohorts at 
                                                                
1 For more on all those proposals, see Gonzales-Ricoy and Gosseries (2017). 
the same age; so young people are not likely to be compensated later 
in their lifespan.  
 
118 The emergence of a disadvantaged generation may be a challenge for 
our generational contract and for intergenerational justice, but not as 
such a challenge to the ideal of democratic equality the authors of this 
chapter subscribe to. Young cohorts may be worse off in terms of 
their job market related opportunities or they may enjoy lower rates 
of benefits to contribution, but their basic civil rights and liberties 
may not be threatened in a fundamental manner. Nonetheless, as we 
will now show, there is ground to be concerned that such inequalities 
between birth cohorts might still pose a challenge to democracy.  
 
119 Indeed, in addition to being massively at risk of social exclusion, 
young cohorts are at the margins of formal politics. They enjoy a low 
political power both through their low voting turnout and the ageing 
of the electorate. Voters’ turnouts are strongly correlated with age. In 
the 2009 local elections in the UK, only 10 percent of eighteen- to 
twenty-four-year-olds said that they had voted compared to 85 
percent of people of sixty-five years old and more. The quantitative 
difference between potential voters, registered voters, and actual 
voters is directly correlated with age: the younger the voters, the 
higher the difference between potential and actual voting turnouts 
will be. This trend is widespread. One could go as far as arguing that 
there is an emerging “intergenerational democratic deficit” whereby 
young people are becoming marginalised within the democratic 
process (Berry 2012, 5).  
 
120 Together, the socioeconomic concerns of current younger 
generations and their political disengagement from formal politics 
feed the suspicion that their interests may not be represented fairly 
by democratic institutions. The problem does not necessarily have to 
be that older generations are willingly trying to exclude or 
disadvantage younger generations. The concern is that they are more 
numerous, vote in higher proportions and are overrepresented in 
parliamentary institutions. Older age groups may thus be in a 
privileged position to shape politics and parliaments with their 
values, attitudes and interests. One recent example of this is the 
generational data of the Brexit referendum in the UK. Some studies 
show that up to 73 percent of the eighteen to twenty-four age group 
have voted Remain when more than 60 percent of voters older than 
sixty-five years voted Leave.2 Younger generations’ views, values and 
perceived interests may in fact get sidelined even when fundamental 
decisions that will affect them for longer than older age groups are 
taken.  
 
121 There are a number of possible ways to improve youth involvement 
in formal politics. One set of solutions consists in reenfranchising the 
young through lowering the voting age to sixteen years old. Youth 
participation can also be promoted through implementing easier 
voting systems and making registration simpler. Increasing funding 
for youth political initiatives, supporting the development of youth 
wings in political parties, and developing civic education in schools 
and universities are additional ways to work toward their 
reengagement.  
 
122 Inequalities between age groups 
 
123 There is another form of generational inequality that is often hidden 
behind the aforementioned inequality between birth cohorts: 
inequalities between age groups. Age groups are groups of people of a 
given age at a given period of time. Individuals will only belong to one 
birth cohort in their life, but they will change age membership 
throughout their lives. Age-group and birth-cohort inequalities are 
distinct since inequalities between age groups do not necessarily 
translate into inequalities between birth cohorts. Age inequalities 
pose a separate challenge to democratic legitimacy, regardless of 
whether they translate into inequalities between successive birth 
cohorts. Let me focus on two examples.  
 
 
                                                                
2 http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why/ 
 124 First, age groups have access to unequal political rights. In most 
countries, young people below the age of eighteen cannot vote or run 
for office. For instance, while sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds were 
allowed to vote in the recent Scottish referendum, they were not 
allowed to vote in the Brexit referendum. One must also be of a 
certain age to be a member of the Senate (thirty in the United States) 
or to run for president (thirty-five in the United States). These age-
based inequalities in basic rights are meant to capture unequal levels 
of competence, abilities and sense of responsibility. But they are not 
unproblematic.  
 
125 For a start, the young have a higher stake in the long-term 
consequences of decisions made today. There are very good reasons 
to keep children out of politics – those have to do with their 
autonomy and the fact that they could end up manipulated, for 
instance. But it is not clear that there are such reasons for older 
teenagers and young adults. Older teenagers are allowed to join the 
labor force, they can be imprisoned, and they can join the army in 
many countries. It seems consistent with this status that they should 
have the right to vote too.  
 
126 A second example is the underrepresentation of young people 
between eighteen and thirty-five years of age in parliaments. At the 
international level, fewer than 2 percent of representatives are 
younger than thirty years old in two-thirds of single and lower 
houses; and three-quarters of upper houses do not elect young 
parliamentarians at all (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2014). As many 
have pointed out, the underrepresentation of young adults in 
parliaments does not look as unfair as the exclusion of women or 
ethnic minority, since they are only unequally represented for a 
portion of their lives. Still, the underrepresentation of youth remains 
problematic since it reinforces the self-image of youth as apolitical 
and may have a negative impact on participation rates. Second, 
decision makers may be lacking experiential knowledge because of 
the lack of young representatives. As a result, they may often not give 
equal weight to the interests of old and young.  
 
127 One radical policy to correct the underrepresentation of young people 
in parliaments is the introduction of youth quotas in the legislatures 
(Bidadanure 2017). Drawing on existing examples of youth quotas in 
the form of reserved seats for young people in parliament in Uganda, 
Kenya and Morocco, the UNDP (2013) puts forward the introduction 
of youth quotas in electoral laws as a way to enhance youth 
representation and participation. The presence of young MPs can be 
expected to have at least two kinds of impacts on decision making. 
The first is substantive. Regardless of their party membership, young 
MPs can be expected to contribute to expanding the available party 
policy packages through pushing for the better inclusion of youth 
concerns in political agendas. Quotas can prevent the important risk 
that policies and debates become driven by paternalism and 
condescendence, if conducted solely within some age groups and in 
exclusion of others.  
 
128 The second potential impact of youth quotas relates to their symbolic 
role. If we consider that people’s self-image are partly tied to their 
political image, then it seems that descriptive representation has 
meaning for whether given individuals are acknowledged as equals. 
Youth quotas would signal to society and young people that their 
contribution is valued and that they are considered with equal 
respect. The absence or underrepresentation of young people in 
parliament, on the contrary, signals the opposite and may contribute 
to an apolitical self-image of young adults.  
 
129 In summary, this section has considered three inequalities between 
generations that pose a challenge to democracy, and are yet often 
overlooked. We must devote more time and resources to 
understanding how each of those inequalities threatens democratic 
equality. The first challenge derives from the political invisibility of 
future generations and the endemic short-termism that comes with it. 
Mechanisms to give voice to future generations today (like 
parliamentary commissions) to legally entrench long-termist goals 
and to monitor progress and drawbacks must be considered. The 
“democratic deficit” between coexisting generations is the second 
intergenerational challenge that we considered: the risk is that small 
and/or disenfranchised cohorts may see their interests sidelined. 
Solutions there include simplifying registration and voting 
procedures, as well as investing in quality political education. The last 
challenge was identified as relating to age-group equality. Here we 
questioned the exclusion of some age groups (in particular teenagers 
and young adults) de jure or de facto from political institutions, 
including from electoral and parliamentary ones. We urged 
politicians to not take for granted those age-based differential 
treatments and to consider ways to make sure the interests of 
disenfranchised age groups are not sidelined. The potential benefits 
of the descriptive representation of young adults in parliaments for 
democratic equality were highlighted.  
 130 1.2 External and Internal Sources of Democratic 
Inequality 
 
131 Globalization 
 
132 Democracy has something of an ambivalent relationship to 
globalization. On the one hand, globalization is typically seen as a 
product of the highest stage of democratic development – a benign 
condition of healthy interdependence made possible by the 
attainment of a prior condition of democracy amongst its 
beneficiaries. Globalization is, in effect, the product of a democratic 
peace. On the other hand, the more detailed analysis of the 
consequences of globalization typically depicts globalization as a 
complex agent of de-democratization – something whose attainment 
makes the practice of democracy ever more difficult. Globalization 
produces, in other words, a democratic deficit.  
 
133 The two perspectives are not strictly incompatible. But this kind of 
connection is rarely made, with the literature and wider public 
discourse of and about globalization typically resolving itself to a 
positive and benign view of globalization starkly counterposed to a 
negative view of globalization’s corrosive effects.  
 
134 The aim of this section is to bring these two opposed perspectives 
into greater dialogue. The argument is presented in two parts dealing, 
respectively, with the challenge posed by globalization and the 
responses to which it might give rise.  
 
135 The challenge of globalization 
 
136 Semantics 
 
137 Globalization is in fact a generic term for a rather disparate array of 
things understood in a great variety of different ways. For the most 
part, however, these understandings can be arrayed along a 
continuum. This ranges from the geographically least precise and 
unexacting to the geographically most restrictive and demanding. At 
the former end of the spectrum, to point to globalization means little 
more than to identify cross-border flows of goods and services, 
finance, migrants, pollutants, infectious agents and so forth. By 
contrast, at the latter end of the spectrum, such flows need to be 
increasingly planetary in their scope to be regarded as evidence of 
globalization. Yet this is not the only definitional divide. It is 
important also to distinguish between contending understandings of 
globalization in terms of whether it is seen as a condition or property 
of the world system that has already been achieved or as a still 
ongoing process or tendency (which may be resisted) for the world 
system to become more global or globalized over time.  
 
138 Such definitional choices have significant implications – both for 
whether we see evidence of globalization or not and, indeed, for the 
significance of any such observation for the viability of democratic 
systems of governance. Clearly, if to confirm the globalization thesis 
we need only show a proliferation of cross-border flows of goods, 
services and so forth, then evidence of globalization abounds. But 
understood in this way globalization may be rather less significant a 
factor than we tend to assume. Conversely, if to confirm the 
globalization thesis we need to establish that such flows are in fact 
both increasingly extensive in their (planetary) scope and increasingly 
intensive in their magnitude, then evidence of globalization is going to 
be rather more difficult to find – but all the more significant if, as and 
when we do find it.  
 
139 There is clearly plenty of room for conceptual confusion here. 
Authors who may well agree on the facts themselves may nonetheless 
disagree over the extent of globalization simply because they impose 
upon the term different definitional standards. Indeed, on closer 
inspection what may seem at first like a dispute over the evidence 
itself often boils down to little more than a semantic difference of 
opinion.  
 
140 The full implications of this become clear when we start to look in 
more detail at those theories that suggest that globalization and the 
respect for democratic choice are likely to be in significant tension 
with one another. For, as we shall see, what many of these share is a 
common analytical structure in which the effects for democracy of 
globalization (typically, a series of imperatives) are derived logically 
from a stylized assumptions about both the behavior and motives of 
business and the degree of integration of world markets. It is to such 
theories directly that we now turn.  
 
141 Globalization as a source of economic imperatives 
 
142 The idea that globalization is corrosive, if not of democracy itself, 
then of the effective space for democratic choice – since its effects 
serve to restrict the array of credible policy options – is not a new 
one. But in its contemporary form it is simply stated. In closed 
national economies, such as those that characterized the pre-
globalization era, capital was essentially immobile and national in 
character; it had no “exit” option. In such an environment 
governments could impose punitive taxation regimes upon unwilling 
and relatively impotent national businesses with little cost to the 
domestic economy.  
 
143 In a world of globalization, by contrast, open economy conditions 
pertain. Capital may now exit from national economies at minimal 
cost. Accordingly, by playing off the regulatory regimes of different 
economies against one another, capital can ensure for itself the 
highest rate of return on its investment. Ceteris paribus, capital will 
exit higher taxation jurisdictions for their lower taxation 
counterparts, comprehensive welfare states for residual states, highly 
regulated labor markets for flexible labor markets and economies 
characterized by strict environmental regulations and high union 
density for those characterized by lapse environmental standards and 
low union density.  
 
144 The process pits national economy against national economy in an 
increasingly intense competitive struggle. States must effectively 
clamber over one another in an ever more frenzied attempt to 
produce a more favorable investment environment for mobile 
(“footloose”) foreign direct investors than their competitors. Yet this 
is not a one-shot game – and an early influx of foreign direct 
investment only increases the dependence of the state upon its 
continued “locational competitiveness.” If investment is to be 
retained in such an environment, states must constantly strive to 
improve the investment opportunities they can offer relative to those 
of their competitors. Any failure to do so can only precipitate a 
hemorrhaging of invested funds, labor shedding and, eventually, 
economic crisis. Big government, and more importantly perhaps the 
democratic choice for big government, is rendered increasingly 
anachronistic – a guarantor not of the interests of citizens or even 
consumers, but a sure means to disinvestment and economic crisis.  
 
145 If this is the general form of the argument, then there are two 
important extensions of it that it is also important to consider. The 
first concerns financial markets – and the political imperatives arising 
from the financial market integration associated with globalization. 
The second is more specific to the period following the global 
financial crisis. It concerns public debt, the state’s obligations to its 
creditors and the associated political imperatives arising from such 
financial dependence.  
 
146 Globalization, of course, is not only associated with trade and foreign 
direct investment flows. Increasingly significant in accounts of 
globalization’s political imperatives are financial flows, particularly 
short-term financial flows. Here the argument is again very simple. In 
a world of heightened financial interdependence, financial market 
actors can be seen, effectively, to “take positions” on the policy 
preferences exhibited by governments. In a sense they reward and 
penalize governments for their conduct of domestic economic 
governance. In so doing, they have the capacity to wreak almost 
instant domestic havoc through the positions they adopt in foreign 
exchange markets and/or by modifying the effective rate of interest 
on government debt. Understood in this way, governments have a 
need to appease financial market actors through their economic and 
social policy choices by, in effect, internalizing a series of external and 
non-negotiable financial imperatives (for fiscal prudence, deficit and 
debt reduction through austerity and a hawkish commitment to price 
stability). Such imperatives, once again, circumscribe as they 
discipline democratic governance at the national level.  
 
147 Finally, in a context of unprecedented levels of public (and, indeed, 
private) debt following the global financial crisis, such imperatives 
are typically seen to have been ratcheted up several notches. As 
Wolfgang Streeck (2014) puts it, today’s nation-states are 
“consolidation states,” simultaneously beholden to their citizens for 
democratic legitimacy and to global financial market institutions for 
the borrowing on which their spending relies. Here, as elsewhere, 
global economic interdependence makes democratic governance a 
more complex juggling of conflicting imperatives in which the 
capacity to respond directly to the demands of citizens is seemingly 
attenuated.  
 
148 But is this credible? Insofar as we are right to accept the combined 
and mutually reinforcing logics of the argument democratic choice is, 
at the national level at least, profoundly threatened by economic 
globalization. The stakes could scarcely be higher. And for this reason, 
above all, we need to proceed with some caution.  
 
149 Whilst the logic is a compelling one and one that has proved 
exceptionally persuasive, not least amongst political elites, the 
evidence for the anticipated effects of such a logic is not nearly so 
strong. The problem here is the convenient simplicity of the analytical 
assumptions from which logics of this kind are derived which 
assumes, for instance, that all taxation is anathema to the interests of 
capital. It is but a short step to the imperative of fiscal and, hence, 
state retrenchment.  
 
150 But this stands in marked contrast to the available empirical 
evidence. This shows, amongst other things, a strong, positive and 
strengthening correlation between state expenditure and economic 
growth under conditions of globalization; a propensity for foreign 
direct investment to be attracted not by low but by high rates of 
corporate taxation, not by highly flexible but in fact tightly regulated 
labor markets and not by low but by high environmental standards; 
and a similar tendency for financial market actors to be 
comparatively lenient on budget deficits, accumulated debt and even 
the inflationary preferences of governments (and central banks), at 
least in OECD countries.  
 
151 The reason for all of this is relatively simple. State expenditure, and 
hence the taxation receipts out of which it is funded, is not nearly as 
damaging of competitiveness nor, relatedly, the return on capital 
invested, than is typically assumed in such models. Foreign direct 
investors, it seems, seek not deregulated labor markets nor low 
corporate taxation so much as highly skilled and flexible labor, stable 
industrial relations regimes and privileged access to the kinds of 
affluent consumer economies typically characterized by the highest 
levels of social and other state expenditure. Similarly, in a context of 
incomplete and costly information, financial markets, are less 
discriminating – and, crucially, less constraining – in their behavior 
that we tend to assume (Mosley 2003).  
 
152 This suggests that the space for democratic deliberation and the 
national policy-making autonomy on which it relies is not as 
restricted as we might assume. But there is a catch. Insofar as our 
political elites are impressed by such logics they may well act as if 
such non-negotiable economic imperatives were real (Hay and 
Rosamond 2002). The effect is much the same, even if the mechanism 
by which it is achieved is very different.  
 
153 The prospects for political globalization 
 
154 This is all very well – and for how we think about democratic 
governance at the national level, it is undoubtedly profoundly 
important. But it is to privilege the national level and, in a context of 
globalization, that is unquestionably problematic. Perhaps the 
simplest way to conceive of this is in terms of the uneven character of 
the process of, not economic, but political globalization. We might 
think of this in terms of the (uneven) globalization of political 
problems and the globalization of political solutions – the point, of 
course, being that there is a gross disparity between the former 
(evidence of which abounds) and the latter (where we are surely 
right to identify a governance deficit).  
 
155 Both forms of political globalization pose problems for traditional 
forms of democratic governance, which tend to privilege the national 
level. Two examples serve particularly to reveal the extent of the 
difficulty. The first is the challenge of global climate change. Here, 
respect for the democratic preferences of citizens at the national level 
is likely to compromise profoundly the capacity and authority to 
impose solutions at a global level. And, whilst we still lack a vision of 
what a genuinely democratic, yet at the same time global, resolution 
of such a problem might entail, this disparity between national and 
global solutions is likely to manifest itself in terms of a political 
stalemate.  
 
156 The second example, the problem of global financial market 
regulation, seems as yet no less intractable. Here again we witness the 
palpable disparity between the need for, and supply of, global 
governance. If, indeed, global financial market actors are as globally 
interconnected and interdependent as the global financial crisis 
reveals them to be, then regulation at a national level, however 
prudential, cannot guard against crisis through contagion. Clearly 
global governance is required. Yet in a context in which different 
states have, in effect, different exposures to and investments in the 
financial markets they ostensibly regulate there is a proliferation of 
potential veto players in the move from national to global regulation. 
The outcome is predictable. The transition from national to global 
governance, despite the inherent logic of such a move, has proved as 
yet impossible. Here the impediment is not so much the capacity to 
envision democratic global governance as to envisage genuinely 
global governance at all.  
 157 And herein lies the cusp of our contemporary dilemma. There is a 
demonstrable and palpable need for global governance and yet, at the 
same time, a clear and compelling argument that respect for the 
democratically expressed wishes of citizens at the national level is 
both anathema to, and will ultimately always thwart, the passing of 
political authority from the national to the transnational level. In the 
end there is only one solution to that problem – the envisioning of a 
form of global governance that is not only efficacious at a planetary 
level but also credibly democratic at the planetary level too. That is a 
tough ask – a challenge to political theorists as much as it is a 
challenge to proponents of democratic global governance. 
 
158 Put bluntly, we have yet to make democracy and globalization 
compatible – and we have, for far too long, proceeded on the rather 
naively optimistic basis that, since globalization is a benign process, 
there is little or no risk to promoting its development in advance of 
any clear strategy for its democratization. We are rapidly reaching the 
point at which that comforting delusion no longer holds – and, in so 
doing, we reach a political watershed. The choice is ours. 
 
159 Populism: The danger to be avoided 
 
160 After years of neglect, populism is now a central theme of political 
experience and research. Until recently, interest in the study of 
populism was traditionally strongest among scholars who saw it as a 
problem. Political scholars who have suggested that populism might 
have a positive role to play in contemporary democracy are thus rare. 
For this minority, however, populism’s putative virtues include “folk 
politics” versus “institutionalized politics;” the concerns of large 
numbers over the interests of the few; the lived experience of local, 
the village, the neighborhood over an abstract, distant state; and 
finally the consistent actualization of popular sovereignty as the 
substance of the whole over and above constitutional rules (Canovan 
1999; Mudde 2001). Populist scholars emphasize also the political 
directness, sincerity, and transparency of ordinary people versus the 
indirection and opacity of representative institutions; they oppose 
the “purity” of political purpose of the many to the bargaining games 
by the politicians, who are part of the few and the elite; they praise 
decisiveness (and also decisionism) over time-consuming 
parliamentary compromises, procedural formalism, and institutional 
obfuscation; they use the language of the organic unity of the populus 
rather than the artificial and abstract language of intellectuals and 
scholars; finally they stress the priority and homogeneity of the whole 
versus pluralism and the conflict of interests (Kazin 1995; Canovan 
2002). They make the character of populism overlap with that of 
democracy and propose to see both of them as the best expressions of 
politics, the art of persuasion and decision by which means the people 
construct their community according to their will (Laclau 2005a).  
 
161 Despite the power contrasts drawn by scholars sympathetic to 
populism, they have yet to converge on even a rough definition of it. 
Populism remains a deeply contested term, more useful polemically 
than analytically, often used merely to brand and accuse actual 
political movements or leaders; this explains the “repugnance with 
which words ‘populism’ and ‘populist’ are uttered,” particularly 
among European scholars (D’Eramo 2013). However, recent events in 
Europe and the United States and recent literature have helped shed 
light on populism and some agreement is possible upon basic 
definitions of it concerning its ideological character, its relation to 
democracy’s promises of public equality, its sociocultural content and 
its strategic mechanism.  
 
162 Populism’s recognizable characters 
 
163 Although plural and diverse because it is socially and historically 
contextual, populism develops within representative democracies 
(not merely democracies) as a fight over the meaning and 
representation of the people, an extreme expression of intense 
majority politics and thus a straining of constitutional democracy to 
its extreme limits, beyond which a change of regime (tyranny or 
dictatorship) could occur. Recognizing populism’s contextual 
specificity (thus its plural manifestations) is no impediment to using 
comparative analyses in view of understanding the reasons of its 
present success in democratic societies. All populist movements 
exhibit a strong reservation and even hostility to the mechanisms of 
representation, in the name of an almost unanimous collective 
affirmation of the will of the people under a leading figure and above 
party pluralism. Yet they do not renounce representation to institute 
direct democracy. Populism is “parasitical” not on democracy in 
general but rather on representative democracy in particular;[6] it is 
a distorted form developing from within it, rather than a regime of its 
own. The relationship of populism with democracy is an issue of 
contention rather than compatibility.  
 
164 Populism is not external to representative democracy but competes 
with it about the meaning and use of representation as a strategy for 
claiming, affirming, and managing the will of the masses. Its 
representative claim is the source of its radical contestation of 
parliamentary democracy, its real target. Indeed, it treats pluralism 
(of interests and ideas, but also as manifested by parties) as litigious 
claims that fragment the body of popular sovereignty and thus must 
be simplified so as to create a polarized scenario that makes the 
people immediately know how to judge and with whom to side. 
Simplification and polarization are in the view of achieving a deeper 
unification of the masses against the existing elites and under an 
organic narrative that most of the time a leader embodies (Urbinati 
2014). Benjamin Arditi has thus written (2008) that populism can be 
seen as representative democracy’s “internal periphery” hardly 
conceivable without a politics of personality. Hence, I propose to 
identify populism with two intertwined political processes: one that 
goes toward polarization of the citizenry in two homogenous groups 
(the many and the few), and the other that goes toward a 
verticalization of the political system that minimizes the role of 
deliberation and mediation and exalts instead that of strong 
majorities and steadfast decisions. Polarization and Caesarism go 
hand in hand and both of them constitute a radical challenge to 
constitutional democracy. Populism can thus be rendered in the 
following way: it is a symptom of representative democracy’s malaise 
as denunciation of the failure of constitutional democracy to be 
consistent with its promises of guaranteeing that all citizens enjoy an 
equal political power and that public equality is the norm leading 
institutions, politicians, and citizens.  
 
165 The promise of democracy 
 
166 Both in its classical and modern version, democracy promises to 
institute and guarantee legal, civil and political equality. It promises 
isonomia or that all the members of the demos (the citizens) are equal 
as subjects to the law and are treated equally by the law. To make 
legal equality and civil equality certain and secure, modern 
constitutions incorporate a list of rights that limit the decision-
making power of the government and watch over the equal treatment 
of all by the magistrates. Democracy promises also isegoria or that all 
adult citizens have the same identical political power when making 
decisions on public issues and the same chance to speak up frankly in 
public, to associate for and promote their views. In representative 
government, this entails that as electors all are identical because their 
votes have equal weight (on this premise only majority rule achieves 
democratic legitimacy); and it entails that as citizens all are different 
in their social conditions and endowed with an equal right to give 
voice to their differences, to form and make public their opinions, to 
know what their government does, and finally to influence elected 
and electors as well.  
 
167 Legal, civil and political equality inspire both the mode and the 
substance of public behavior because identical as members of the 
demos and in their voting power, democratic citizens are not identical 
and not even equal when they give expression to their voice and cast 
their vote. In relation to its promises of equality, thus, democracy 
proposes things at first glance seem contradictory: that political 
power should be distributed regardless of the social, cultural, and 
economic conditions of the citizens and that it should be used by the 
citizens to make sure that those conditions are not so unequal if the 
equal political power is to be effective. Democracy claims that 
procedures must ignore the social conditions of the citizens and yet 
that they will be used so that the citizens can make their social 
condition a close as possible to their political status. The tension 
between formal and substantial equality is in the very genes of 
democracy, not an accident or a defect because citizens’ equality 
refers to both a way of making decisions (government form) and a 
way of participating in making them (political form). This makes a 
procedural conception of democracy simply an incomplete picture.  
 
168 A purely procedural reading is too narrow to be explicative of the 
potentials and transformations which a democratic society is capable 
of. For sure it can hardly grasp populistic forms of representation but 
also ideological identifications among citizens and partisan 
aggregations animating the public forum. To complete our picture, we 
should consider that in nation-state based constitutional 
governments, the diarchic nature of democracy has been actualized 
through the construction of “the people” as the legal and legitimate 
sovereign of the law but also as the representative claimant that 
contests and proposes, that reclaims its visibility beyond its legal 
status. Like democracy, the people possess a double nature as is at 
once the norm or legal actor in whose name decisions are made and 
the concrete actor of the proposals and decisions.  
 
169 De jure and de facto levels are intertwined and their tense 
combination makes a democratic society an amalgam in permanent 
and sometime turbulent motion, in which the promises of equality are 
at once working procedures and instigations to social criticism and 
innovation. This tension feeds populism, which represents an all-
political transformation of the forum of opinions that becomes a force 
more authoritative than elections, often amplified by the media. 
Populism repudiates democracy’s diarchy of opinion and decision in 
view of merging fully the way people think and the way people want. 
It is to representative democracy what demagoguery was to direct 
democracy. According to Aristotle's pivotal analysis, demagoguery 
within democracy is: (a) a permanent possibility insofar as it relies 
upon the public use of speech and opinion like democracy; (b) a more 
intense use of the principle of the majority so as to make it almost 
absolute or a form of power more than a method for making decisions 
(populism is the rule of the majority rather than a politics that uses 
majority rule); and (c) a waiting room for a possible tyrannical 
regime. We may attribute the following four aspects to populism: it 
flourishes as a fellow traveler of democracy; is a radical form of 
democratic action as strong majoritarianism; develops in times of 
social distress and increasing inequality; and its outcome may be 
risky to constitutional democracy (Taggart 2000).  
 
170 Populism’s contextual specificity 
 
171 A complex category hard to synthetize in a clear-cut definition, 
populism’s factors and implications are deeply contextual and 
connected to the malaise of democratizing or democratic societies. In 
the United States, where the term was coined as a party name in the 
age of postcivil war industrial reconstruction and never brought upon 
a regime change, populism developed along with political 
democratization and was, and still is, predictably met positively by 
historians and political theorists because of its claim of inclusion of 
the many or no so well represented (Kazin 1995). Born when the 
country was ruled by an elected notabilate representing the interests 
of an oligarchy (before universal suffrage was implemented), the 
Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights became extant 
conditions for a more democratized polity, and populism a collective 
movement against the “domestic enemies of the people” (Frank 2010) 
in the name of an alleged purity of the origins of popular government 
and its adulteration by the artificial complexity of civilization and the 
institutional organization of the state (Lasch 1991). The bureaucratic 
and normative state apparatus, which started to be built in mid-
nineteenth century, made the work of the government more distant 
from the people and its operations more opaque and hard to be 
understood by ordinary citizens.  
 
 172 On the other hand, in some Latin American countries, “the land of 
populism” in Carlos de la Torre’s words (2016), populism has been 
met with mixed feelings in relation to its historical phases: thus 
whether it was evaluated at the beginning of its career or at the pick 
of its fulfillment as a regime; as an opposition party mobilizing 
against an existing government or as a regime itself; and then also, as 
a regime in its consolidation or facing a succession in power (Rovira 
Kaltwasser 2012; Finchelstein 2014). Like in the United States, 
populism in Latin America also emerged in the age of social 
modernization but much like fascism in Italy it governed the path 
toward modernity that used state power to protect and empower 
their popular classes, repress dissent, and meanwhile implement 
social-welfare policies (Germani 1978). Thus Ernesto Laclau (2005) 
described populist (and Peronism in particular) as a strategy of 
hegemonic rebalancing within the “power blocs” through the 
incorporation of the popular-democratic ideology of the masses 
within the ruling majority. Finally, in Western Europe, populism made 
its appearance with democratization in early twentieth century, along 
with colonial expansionism, militarization of society coinciding with 
World War One, and the growth of ethnic nationalism per effect of the 
distress that the war. It helped justify xenophobic ideologies that 
aimed at homogenizing the nation and in fact promoted Fascist 
regimes based on mass propaganda, political simplification of 
friends/enemies divide and Caesaristic leadership incorporating the 
people as one (Mueller 2011).  
 
173 Populism is growing once again, not only in Latin America and in poor 
societies struggling to modernize and democratize. Populism is back 
in several European countries, within a supranational quasi-
federative context and several decades of cosmopolitan culture of 
rights and toleration that lessened nationalistic politics. The 
European Union that developed as antitotalitarian project after World 
War Two, is a novel frontier of populism, which is emerging no longer 
and simplistically as a claim for going back to a pre-European Union 
order, but rather as a design for a new representation of the 
European peoples as ancestral totalities against external sources of 
contamination such as affluent cosmopolitan elites and migrants. 
Decline of socioeconomic well-being combines with an erosion of 
democratic legitimacy in relaunching populist leaders and 
movements in several European states and also the Unites States, 
which is experience resurgent nativism aimed against immigrants 
much like the old Europe and is no longer the exceptional and only 
place in which populism is the name of good democracy. To be sure, 
some leftwing forms of populism in both continents there are that 
claim to be inclusive of the new immigrants rather than exclusionary, 
yet they make their claim not in the name of the democratic promises 
but as a challenge to the constitutional fabric of representative 
democracy (Weyland 2013).  
 
174 Renascent populism witnesses waning confidence in core 
representative democratic institutions such as parties, parliaments 
and elections. As leading scholars have stressed, shrinking party 
membership and increasing estrangement between politicians and 
voters testify to disillusionment with representative democracy 
(Manin 1997; Mair 2013; Merkel 2014; Rosanvallon 2015). Politicians 
are regularly accused of having lost touch with ordinary people’s 
concerns and made politics into an insipid mainstreamism that 
chooses to neglect society’s most grave needs and concerns in order 
not to compromise electoral consent. Yet antiparty sentiment is 
primed to damage constitutional democracy as citizens need to be 
offered recognizable political proposals in order to side with and 
against and choose and participate. In consolidated democracies, 
thus, populism seems to follow a cycle of electoral abstention and 
apathy, which is a side effect of mainstreamism and at the origin of 
citizens’ mistrust in party politics, the growth of antiparty sentiments, 
and the attraction of the populist rebuff of “practical democracy” 
(Mair 2002). When elected politicians and citizens become two 
separate groups that make the opposition between “the many” and 
“the few” an easily grasped catchword, when ordinary citizens 
witness increase of social distress and gross violations of economic 
equality in the general indifference of their representatives and while 
the most powerful acquire more voice in politics, it may very well 
happen that people distrust “practical politics” (Mény and Surel 
2002).  
 
175 These are traditional factors that help explain the growth of populism 
in democratic societies: the quest for more intense power by the 
majority is primed to emerge from time to time like a symptom of 
mistrust in democracy’s ability to fulfill its promise of equal political 
power. Yet some additional factors contribute today in reinvigorating 
the populist rhetoric, such as a globalized financial capitalism that 
weakens the decision-making power of sovereign states and a 
globalized market of labor force that narrows the possibility of 
striking a social-democratic compromise between capital and labor 
upon which democracy was rebuilt after World War Two. The 
weakening of state sovereignty before global corporate business 
meets with the people’s call for closed borders in several nation-
states as if democratic citizens thought that the protection of their 
political power demands the containment of free movement of 
peoples and of free competition over salary and social benefits. Like 
in the past, populism associates politics of social redistribution with 
protectionist politics; in addition, the dramatic phenomenon of 
terrorism associated with Islamic extremism propels a politics of 
state security at expense of civil rights and highlights the nationalistic 
character of democracy as a vital condition of cultural and religious 
homogeneity to be protected against external enemies. Hence, in 
several member-states of the European Union, anti-European 
sentiments, economic distress, and a cultural discourse dominated by 
cosmopolitan elites determine a representative deficit which can 
open a political space for those who have the perception of not having 
their voice represented: populist leaders are primed to find there an 
inviting milieu for their antiestablishment plans.  
 
176 In a globalized world, populism comes to play two roles: that of 
denouncing social inequality and the privileges of the wealthy few 
and that of reclaiming the priority of the national unity of the people. 
Resuming the two ancient categories – ethnos and demos – whose mix 
steered the construction of post-eighteenth century democratic 
“people,” one might say that populism’s renaissance in several 
democratic countries is both a symptom and a triggering force that 
can disrupt that mix. Indeed, on the one hand, the demos (“the 
people”) tends to de ate its political meaning as the collective of 
equals in power (citizens/electors) and to translate it into a social 
unit identified with the majority, and on the other hand, the ethnos 
(“the nation”), which the political nation of the equal subjects to the 
law was meant to neat of all ancestral meanings, tends to be identified 
with prepolitical characters not acquirable by simply being subjects 
to the law (Portinaro 2013). Briefly, populism combines two 
processes: of politicization of the ethnical aspect and of ethnicization 
of the political aspect that have made for “the popular sovereign” in 
modern democracy. It thus shows how weak and context-dependent 
the roots of representative democracy are.  
 
177 Populism’s strategic mechanisms 
 
178 Based on these premises, a distinction has to be made between 
populism as a popular movement and populism as a ruling power, a 
prospective that allows us to face populism both in its rhetorical style, 
its propaganda tropes and ideology, and finally its aims and 
achievements. This double condition mirrors the diarchic character of 
democracy we have mentioned: power of decision and power of 
opinion qualify constitutional democracy as an order in which 
citizens have an equal right to make decisions by voting directly on 
issues (referenda) and for representatives and to construct the issues 
or claims that ask for decisions to be made, sustained, or revised.  
 
179 Populism has to be evaluated and judged in relation to both 
authorities: as a movement of opinion and as a system of decision 
making. It is inaccurate to treat it as identical with “popular 
movements,” movements of protest, or “the popular” as it can be 
much more than that. Hence there is populist rhetoric but not yet 
populist power when the polarizing and antirepresentative discourse 
is made up of a social movement that wants to be a constituency 
independent of elected officials, wants to resist becoming an elected 
entity, does not have nor want representative leaders unifying its 
several claims, and wants to keep elected of officials or the 
government under the scrutiny of the public. This was the case, for 
instance, of popular movements of contestation and protest like the 
Girotondi in Italy in 2002, Occupy Wall Street in the Unites States in 
2011, and Indignados in Spain in 2011. Without an organizing 
narrative, the aspiration to win seats in the Parliament or the 
Congress and a leadership claiming its people to be the true 
expression of the people as a whole, a popular movement remains 
very much what it is: a sacrosanct democratic movement of opinion, 
protest, and contestation against a trend in society that betrays some 
basic principles of equality, which society itself has promised to 
respect and fulfill.  
 
180 On the other hand, there is populist rhetoric and populist power 
when a movement does not want to be a constituency independent of 
the elected officials but wants instead to conquer the representative 
institutions and win a majority in order to model society on its own 
ideology of the people. This is for instance the case of Hungary’s 
Fidesz party that in 2012 won a supermajority of the seats in 
Parliament and used it to scrap the old Constitution by amending it 
continuously, entrenching its own political vision at the expense of 
opposition parties and an independent judiciary. Similar events 
happened in Poland after the electoral victory of Kaczyński’s PiS after 
2014.  
 
181 Populism, both as a movement and populism as an intrastate power, 
is parasitical on representative democracy either because it opposes 
representative democracy or wants to conquer it. But while a certain 
populist rhetoric is to be detected in almost all parties (particularly 
when they radicalize their claims close to elections), populism as a 
ruling power has some recognizable characteristics that can sharply 
contrast with “practical democracy” and the procedural structures of 
ordinary politics, like hostility toward party pluralism, the principles 
of constitutional democracy and the division of powers. Hence 
although ingrained in the ideology of the people and the language of 
democracy, populism as a ruling power tends to give life to 
governments that stretch the democratic rules toward an extreme 
majoritarianism, often discriminating against minorities. Populism in 
power is a pars-pro-toto project that may have devastating effects on 
constitutional democracy (Arato 2013). This makes me conclude that 
while a symptom of political and social malaise in democratic 
societies, populism can hardly be a cure. Factors driving populism can 
be found in the partial regimes of elections and political rights to 
participation within embedded democracies (see: Introduction), 
where people at the lower end of the social strata feel systematically 
excluded and underrepresented or simply fear to be victims of threats 
they cannot face and control with ordinary legal and political means. 
In addition, a cause for populist discourse is also to be found in the 
partial regime of “power to govern” as national sovereignty is 
challenged by global markets and supranational governances such as 
the European Union. Yet regardless of its social specificity and the 
objective duress that fuels it, if populism comes to power it explicitly 
challenges the proper working of the “civil rights” regime and the 
regime of horizontal accountability granting too much power to the 
executive (decisionism and democracy of the leader) at the expenses 
of the legislature and the judiciary (deliberation and the rule of law). 
The question is that although populist leaders seeking power promise 
to include the excluded and overturn an elected oligarchy, once in 
power they end up by attacking the institutions of liberal democracy, 
seizing central government, controlling and even repressing social 
movements and oppositions, limiting civil liberty and contrasting 
media pluralism. For this reason, although a symptom of malaise of 
democratic societies, populism can hardly be a remedy.  
 
182 Technology and science 
 
183 As contemporary societies increasingly build their governance 
structures and their imaginations about future developments around 
scientific knowledge, as they privilege specific kinds of expertise and 
embrace technological innovation as a sign of advancement, it is 
essential to carefully reflect how this politics of knowledge and 
technology is entangled with questions of inequality. When it comes 
to questions of democracy and inequality we often witness the 
coexistence of rather contradictory positions. Political leadership 
strongly tries to construct and keep alive an unquestioned ideal of 
scientific and technological rationality as a key governance principle, 
pretending that this would quasi-automatically improve democratic 
societies and render them more equal for its constituencies. However, 
simultaneously concerns are voiced that science and technology 
might contribute to reinforcing existing, or even creating new, 
inequalities. Indeed, access to the advancements in science and 
technology had become an important generator of power differentials 
both within and across societies.  
 
184 The situation is complex. While both scientific knowledge and 
technologies have definitely created partial solutions to problems in 
the areas of health, food, energy, communication, or transport, 
inequalities persisted. Thinking democracy and inequality together, 
thus means to question the impact of the knowledge and 
technological infrastructures which form the basis of contemporary 
democracies, to be attentive to the many places and moments the 
performance of democracy is tied to questions of techno-scientific 
choices, and to unpack the new challenges citizens have to face in 
order to fully participate in contemporary societies.  
 
185 (In)equality has to be understood as a situated outcome of specific 
forms of techno-scientific change and are always shifting. In analogy 
also “a democratic society cannot fully or at every moment be a 
democracy” and will “depend upon mutually reinforcing democratic 
ideas, political culture, political imaginaries, institutions, and 
practices” (Ezrahi 2012). Science and technology play an essential 
part in both, democracy and (in)equality. The aim is to think how we 
can bring them together reasonably well.  
 
 
 186 The attention therefore has to move from asking principled questions 
– is something democratic and do techno-scientific developments 
create conditions of equality –, and be attentive to the multiplicity of 
situations in which both democracy and equality are to be realized. 
This also means considering shifting socioeconomic conditions, the 
ways in which access to education and to different kinds of 
innovation is structured, the distribution of the capacities to raise 
voice in relation to techno-scientific issues, and many more. And it 
becomes essential to investigate the structural conditions – that is, 
technological, educational, or market infrastructures – which might 
keep inequalities in place.  
 
187 Values, science and technology: Whose values?  
 
188 Scholarship in science and technology studies (STS) has shown how 
the knowledge and technologies we create and the dominant values 
and normative ideals we express in our societies have to be seen as 
deeply intertwined (Jasanoff 2004). As a consequence, we have to 
admit that the places where technologies are designed and 
knowledge is generated matter as well as the persons who hold the 
capacity to steer or at least to participate in these processes. Scientific 
knowledge and its technological realisations are thus imbued with 
values specific to the environment in which they were created; they 
have to be understood as (re)producing existing value orders. In 
terms of asking the democracy-equality question it is thus essential to 
pay attention to who gets imagined as potential user (groups) and 
who is forgotten; to who defines the problems to be solved and what 
counts as adequate solution; to the places where innovations are 
created; and, finally, how sets of values get imposed through the 
introduction of new technologies or the foregrounding of specific 
kinds of knowledge.  
 
189 This calls us to pay attention to how specific technological 
arrangements are tacitly implemented for keeping certain social or 
political orders in place. In particular feminist scholars such as Judy 
Wajcman (2009) have pointed to the fact that the material forms in 
which technologies come, afford or inhibit certain gender power 
relations. If we consider the importance of broader economic and 
social circumstances of technological production, the exclusion of 
specific groups of people (women, members of lower socioeconomic 
classes, …) from technological domains points to a reinforcement of 
inequalities in a techno-scientific world. This then does not stay 
limited to questions of equal employment opportunities, but it is 
about how and for whom the world we live in gets shaped. The 
politics of knowledge and technology is thus an integral to the 
renegotiation of power relations – with gender and other inequalities 
in the focus.  
 
190 This calls us to pay attention to how specific technological 
arrangements are tacitly implemented for keeping certain social or 
political orders in place. In particular feminist scholars such as Judy 
Wajcman (2009) have pointed to the fact that the material forms in 
which technologies come, afford or inhibit certain gender power 
relations. If we consider the importance of broader economic and 
social circumstances of technological production, the exclusion of 
specific groups of people (women, members of lower socioeconomic 
classes, …) from technological domains points to a reinforcement of 
inequalities in a techno-scientific world. This then does not stay 
limited to questions of equal employment opportunities, but it is 
about how and for whom the world we live in gets shaped. The 
politics of knowledge and technology is thus an integral to the 
renegotiation of power relations – with gender and other inequalities 
in the focus.  
 
191 Ordering societies through classification and standardization: Whose 
order?  
 
192 A second site where questions of democracy and inequality are 
addressed are the classifications and standards that have become the 
basic infrastructures assuring that contemporary societies can work. 
Whether or not you are granted certain civil rights, have access to 
specific kinds of health care, or can chose your way of living, all this is 
related, in one way or another, to how well somebody is represented 
in such classifications and standardization processes. Thus, the very 
idea of equality and its realization in the political realm very much 
depend on the outcome of such orderings of society. Throughout 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries we witness countless efforts of 
emerging nation states to make classify their constituency and thus 
make them calculable – efforts to design nation states in line with 
what is believed to be scientific rationality (Scott, J. C. 1999).  
 
193 These processes of ordering society produced ever more extended 
collections of information on citizens, on social relations, economic 
life and many more, but also supported numerous planning efforts 
meant to realize desired futures. Such processes never simply 
describe the world as it is, but they make it through the description. 
The census, for example, contributed to the creation of communities 
which did not exist prior to the counting of and the accounting for 
them. In the end, it was a small elite who decided what should be 
counted and what order should prevail, thus allowing political power 
greater control over the lives of their subjects.  
 
194 While classifications and standards are essential to extending our 
reach in space and time, we have to be aware that “each standard and 
each category valorizes some point of view and silences another” 
(Bowker and Star 1999). While we can argue that classifying is 
inescapable if we want to live in an ordered world, it is still related to 
value choices. Classifications and standards advantage some while 
pushing others to the margin, some areas get privileged while others 
suffer. The power of these classifications lies in the fact that over time 
they are regarded as “natural” and are taken for granted. They only 
become explicit when belonging to a specific category denies access 
or does not give the same rights as to others. In many ways ethnic and 
racial, but also gender and sexual categorizations, though used very 
differently in different national and supranational contexts, are 
excellent examples for the making of essential differences and thus 
defining relevant groups, to be cared for. Democratic societies 
therefore need to carefully reflect how these classifications are made, 
and how they are decided upon, giving voice to specific groups and 
individuals, while implicitly denying it to others.  
 
195 Part of these questions of addressing differences have be more 
recently reformulated in an expanding diversity discourse, which 
tries to reevaluate what it means to attend to differences among 
human bodies and lives. Implementing the concept of diversity in 
health care, which is key area where inequality matters, shows the 
difficulty of dealing with bringing together social justice concerns 
with evidence about the uneven distribution of health and disease 
across populations, with empowering and positive visions of 
differences and concerns of being able to uphold contemporary 
healthcare system (Felt, Felder, and Penkler 2016). Access to health 
care is one such site where classifications potentially can do both 
create better access and create (new) inequalities.  
 
196 Living in an experimental society: Whose benefit, whose voice?  
 
197 More than two decades of scholarship have pointed at the 
experimental nature of contemporary societies, that is, at our limited 
capacity to anticipate the outcomes of techno-scientific change. The 
recent disaster in Fukushima has clearly pointed to the complexities 
and uncertainties of what it means to different groups of people to 
live with nuclear technologies. Or, when it comes to the impact of 
environmental damages, we clearly witness the unequal distribution 
of risks and benefits. Under the label of environmental justice STS 
scholars carefully investigated how the consequences of such real-
world experiments often have to be carried in a disproportional 
manner by marginalized groups, pointing to the importance of 
considering categories like race, gender, or class as they come to 
matter in important ways (e.g., Ottinger and Cohen 2011). Reflecting 
the nexus of democracy and inequality thus means asking: Who has 
the authority to design and do such experiments? Who is exposed to 
them? And, who might benefit from them? Answering these questions 
might lead us to understand how inequalities do both emerge and are 
kept in place.  
 
198 These reflections have a quite immediate connection to two related 
debates: one on participatory justice in techno-scientific societies and 
the other on the role of information access in a world structured by 
new information and communication technologies (ICTs).  
 
199 More than two decades ago, the question of an increased need for 
public participation started to be raised persistently with the 
crumbling of the strong belief that the spread of scientific knowledge 
and technologies across contemporary societies would lead to more 
democracy and equality. Concerns were voiced about the emergence 
of new hierarchies, allowing only a rather exclusive elite of 
knowledgeable subjects to direct societal choices. This has triggered a 
flurry of participatory exercises that were on a formal level deeply 
committed to openness, equality, representativeness and 
transparency and in which citizens should be able to express their 
concerns regarding techno-scientific developments. However, science 
and technology studies scholars have pointed the severe limitations 
such exercises meet in practice (Felt 2007). Not only are assumptions 
about who may legitimately speak in the name of society already built 
into participatory designs, in most exercises also the questions were 
preframed, severely limiting the potential outcomes. Furthermore, 
social orders are at work within the discussion settings, but a strong 
educational bias of those participating hinted at rather unequal 
conditions of participation (e.g., Chilvers and Kearnes 2016).  
 
200 A number of case studies have successfully demonstrated the 
potential value of granting lay expertise space in shaping techno-
scientific developments. Examples would be the AIDS movement in 
the 1970s that managed to change essential parts in treatment and 
prevention or, more recently, the citizen science groups forming 
around radiation measurements in the aftermath of the Fukushima 
disaster. In all these cases, we have seen how important it is to open 
up knowledge generation to different perspectives and how this 
allows to make important changes to how democracy and equality 
can be connected in new ways.  
 
201 This brings us, second, to the question of ICTs, which feature 
prominently in debates concerning questions of science, technology 
and inequality (Wyatt et al. 2001). When introduced, they were 
expected to free people from a number of limitations. Access to 
information from a broad variety of sources, participation in political 
processes from remote places as well as access to health expertise 
should become more equal. This should allow for a gain in overall 
justice and thus bring us closer to the ideal of democratic societies. 
This rather positive and inclusive view is however clearly opposed by 
analysts who argue that the “ICT revolution” might, quite to the 
contrary, be a source of new inequalities. Unequal access to the 
internet between and within regions, but also the need to develop 
new skills in searching, sorting, and assessing information, creates 
advantages only for some while further disadvantaging others. 
Threats to exercise social control through different forms electronic 
surveillance would undermine the value of privacy held very high in 
liberal democracies and might touch vulnerable groups stronger that 
other parts of society. In the same move, we also witness new forms 
of segregation on the labour markets, given the information intensive 
forms of work emerging. Finally, the spread of algorithms introduces 
unaccounted biases and calls for a broader public debate on these 
structures as one way to be able to reflect and navigate the 
information landscape in a self-defined manner.  
 
202 To sum up, there is no doubt that science and technology have made 
essential contributions to the advancement of contemporary 
democracies. Yet, putting scientific and technological rationality at 
the core of governance has not necessarily led to creating more 
equality, both within nation states as well as between regions of the 
world. It has in some areas even rendered societal inclusion more 
challenging than ever before. This means that we need to recognize 
that fostering science and technology alone will not suffice to create 
the desired outcome, but that new models assuring access to the 
benefits of techno-scientific advances for broader constituencies of 
societies and meaningful models of participation in the development 
of knowledge and innovations need to be developed. The challenge 
will remain, to achieve both building our democracies along techno-
scientific rationalities while acknowledging that this is necessarily 
always also linked to ethical choices for which we need to take 
responsibility. Embracing science and technology can thus not be 
conceptualised as a moment of depoliticising choices concerning the 
directions in which our societies develop, but much rather of 
acknowledging that this is politics by other means.  
  
203 Part II: The Democratic Responses 
to These Challenges 
 
 
204 Bringing the demos back in 
 
205 “We the people” was a formative proposition, declaring many people 
a people and thereby constituting them as such. Moreover, it was a 
democratic people not only because the constitution organized 
fundamental democratic values – liberty, equality, well-being – into 
an institutional design, but also because the public debate between 
Federalists and antifederalist created, a democratic consciousness. A 
democratic people or demos is a body of political individuals that 
perceive themselves to be citizens within a state, one civic people, 
with conflicts and arguments, different representative institutions 
that nevertheless adhere to a set of rules and feel part of a collective 
political identity. Democracy is government of the people, for the 
people and by the people: the people make the body-politics of the 
sovereign state; the authors of its legitimacy. The demos rules by way 
of expressing the will of the people. This will is a shared will – to be 
part of the people, and to be involved in the decision-making and 
policy processes of the polity. Being a demos is a continuous 
prerequisite for democratic self-rule that embeds political equality: 
one person, one vote. Each citizen, being part of the body politic, has 
her own unique voice, cast as a vote. A vote for a candidate, party, 
worldview – that represents her through elections in the governing of 
the state. The will of the people is not one will of all the people, but an 
expression of the contingent will of the majority, respecting the 
minorities, believing in continuous debate and the possibility of 
replacing the ruling power. Moreover, a citizen’s political self-
realization goes beyond just the vote, involving participation in 
political debate, the policy process and the creation and recreation of 
the public will.  
 206 Much contemporary democratic practice and theory abandons the 
demos. However, while nationalism, populism, racism, and 
xenophobia are problems of and for contemporary democracy; 
democracy without a civic body within a sovereign state – that shares 
a political collective identity expressed through public media, public 
opinion and public consciousness – and based on shared values of 
freedom, self-realization and crucially public equality – is a defective 
democracy.  
 
207 Democracy and inequality: The structure of the argument 
 
208 Global inequality is becoming mixed up with social inequality. That is why the 
renationalization of democracy (through greater social cohesion and 
reappropriation of the political by citizens) is one way of combating both 
simultaneously. This struggle must therefore be a top priority for our time 
(Rosanvallon 2013, 299).  
 
209 To suggest the renationalization of democracy in the postnational 
constellation of a globalized era sounds like a reactionary project. Yet 
renationalization – or, alternately, redemocratization of democracy 
by way of rethinking the demos as a core concept of democracy – is at 
the heart of democracy. Rosanvallon wants to renationalize 
democracy in order to combat economic inequality, analyzing 
capitalism as the driving force behind the crisis of democracy 
manifested in a crisis of equality. Yet the crisis of democracy is also a 
crisis of equality as a political concept. There are strong connections 
between economic inequalities and political disempowerment – but 
we consider democratic inequality on its own terms, as stemming 
from the disenchantment with the demos as the locus of the political 
collective identity. Re-instating the demos is thus a precondition for 
democratic equality.  
 
210 This section addresses three basic challenges to the democratic state 
– cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism and democratic governance – 
from the perspective of public equality. In contrast to some other 
contributions to this chapter, it argues that a demos is a fundamental 
part of democracy that embodies public equality and provides 
political dimension which the global or the local levels cannot replace.  
 
211 Humanity as a whole?  
 
212 The argument for a cosmopolitan world community goes something 
like this: a state is an arbitrary, historically contingent invention; the 
ethical community that underlies all individuals is a cosmopolitan 
community, based on universal human rights, in a borderless world. 
Thus, since individuals possessing universal rights are all equal, the 
relevant moral community is the global one.  
 
213 Is the idea of political community coextensive with a sovereign state 
redundant? From the ethical perspective, all humans possess human 
rights. But is the best way to protect human rights one unitary 
regime? Empirically, we live in a world of sovereign states with some 
international bodies that derive their legitimacy from agreements 
among the constituting states. There are no global political 
institutions whose legitimacy does not derive from states. Moreover, 
those international bodies enjoy declarative force but a minimal real 
ability to coerce or sanction against violations of human rights. Some 
members of the human rights council of the UN are far from 
protecting human rights in their own countries. Human rights may be 
universal in nature; yet, they are, today, best protected and practiced 
through being enshrined in the constitutions and public cultures and 
processes of democratic states. Thus, realizing human rights is not a 
given but a process. The idea of one ethical-political community, 
actually undermines the legitimacy of sovereign states, thereby 
risking the only enclaves that actively protect human rights. But what 
about equality? Equality of the individuals is their equality as citizens 
within a state. There is a profound relation between their ability to 
experience self-autonomy and be active political citizens in a 
sovereign state. Being part of the policy process, of decision making, 
of bringing about change – is crucial for the translation of autonomy 
into practice. It is hardly achievable in a global community.  
 
 214 Social policies, based on solidarity, are also under threat. It is one 
thing to pay taxes and gain national security, public health and 
education, quite another to provide it to every traveler in a borderless 
society. Solidarity is an embodiment of the idea of public goods. The 
public good for humanity is almost an empty signifier. But the public 
goods that are being debated, decided upon and acted on within a 
democracy are fundamental to democracy. In particular, the balance 
between economy and politics is a major function of states, which will 
be undermined by globalism. Neoliberalism – that seeks to weaken 
the state and let the market rule alone – would prevail. States are the 
only collective actors that act through fiscal and other means to 
change structures of inequality, to invest in the public domain and to 
redistribute resources, as elected governments have the legitimacy to 
promote equality of opportunities. The poor would be poorer without 
states, and in a borderless world there would be no solidarity either 
one’s fellow citizens.  
 
215 The third fundamental dimension of political equality that is being 
lost in a so-called global community is the demos as a discursive 
community. The “will of the people” is what emerges from political 
discussion, debates, conversations, contestations and conflicts. Being 
part of the political discourse is what enables each citizen to be a 
political actor, who self-realizes herself in the public realm. The 
demos is not an ethnos, it is being part of a political community 
within a democratic state. Cosmopolitanism, for the sake of abstract 
universal rights, jeopardizes the protection of human rights via the 
rule of law and the fundamental role of the demos.  
 
216 Multiculturalism – a fragmented political arena?  
 
217 The second challengers are voluntary associations – cultural, ethnic, 
religious and local communities, usually situated in civil society. The 
argument is the following: the idea of shared values and active 
participation have a deeper political meaning in communities than in 
states, where political behavior is reduced to voting and the national 
identity is loose. Local communities are more involving and relevant 
to the people than the abstract state. Politics as a way of life is best 
practiced in communities.  
 
218 What happens to the concept of equality under a multicultural gaze? 
The liberal view assumes that community is the extension of the 
liberty of the individual; but what about equality? Free individuals are 
free to join different communities. But the main idea of equality is a 
second order one: equality of the groups to be different from one 
another. Equality of difference extended to communities. What 
happens to individuals under such a framework? Some might thrive; 
others might be sacrificing their human rights under the shared 
values of a particular community, women rights in traditional 
communities notwithstanding. Still others may choose or find no 
significant community to be part of. The individual is no longer the 
building block of politics but groups and hence is vulnerable. Who is 
to enshrine the individuals within those groups, and those without 
communities? The rule of law; the state.  
 
219 What does multiculturalism mean for democracy? How do different 
communities collectively decide whether to go to war? Raise taxes? 
Decide what are the shared values or public goods? While 
communities act on their own interest, what authority do they have to 
act on behalf of individuals? Do African-Americans or Muslims or 
lesbians have shared ideas on fiscal policies, state/religion relations 
or war and peace? Hardly so. So communities perform a partial role 
and should not be viewed as alternatives to citizens acting together 
within states.  
 
220 Finally, most communities are still based on a primordial association 
– one is born into an ethnos, religion, gender or sex. A releasing 
power of democracy is that it treats individuals as equal. It provides a 
process of transformation of representation from identity into 
interests, ideology and policy preferences. A citizen may choose 
whether she votes as a Catholic, worker or a feminist. It is not 
prescribed to her by a primordial identity. So communities may 
appear as much more engaging in nature but in fact fail to perform 
the roles of the democratic state in the various faces of equality. They 
may compliment and revive the demos, not replace it.  
 
221 Democratic governance beyond the demos?  
 
222 Contemporary theory argues that human societies are increasingly 
governed by a web of organizations that partake in the policy 
processes and provide global governance through deliberative 
democracy. Those voluntary associations – international NGOs, 
activists, social movements – are acting in the free market or civil 
society. This theory of governance connects the local with the global 
and gives only a partial role to states. But what is the account of 
public equality in a complex theory of governance?  
 
223 A. Participation 
 
224 Citizenship is a form of membership in the political game within 
democratic states. Active civil society extends participation far 
beyond voting. But moving participation from institutional 
democracy to global or local civil society entails moving from 
universal to voluntary participation; from individuals to 
organizations; from relatively compact participation – voting – into 
demanding engagement. The clear losers of such transformations are 
the disadvantaged groups. While voting is based on political equality, 
voluntary participation leaves those who lack time, resources or 
education outside of the effective participation circle. True, in the 
minimal act of voting the dropping levels of participation is most 
dramatic for the poor. Yet, this would be even more the case in 
voluntary associations and deliberative processes in which the highly 
educated middle classes participate. Moreover, while within a 
democracy there is an institutionalized solidarity among the demos, 
enhancing public education and welfare, which facilitate 
participation, there is no such obligation in global civil society.  
 225 B. Political Representation 
 
226 Voluntary associations, as the building blocks of new forms of 
representation, undermine the role of parties as the main 
representative actor in sovereign democracies. NGOs become the 
main actors. The move from the individual to the group is the first 
hindrance to equality. Politics of recognition – symbolic power and 
the right to be different communities – often works against economic 
equality. Also, in the party system the main ideological axis is the Left-
Right axis: the major conflict in society is about redistribution of 
resources, life chances and welfare. Identity politics moves the nexus 
of contestation from economics to culture and away from the state to 
global civil society, decreasing the centrality of economic and political 
equality on the political agenda.  
 
227 C. Governing 
 
228 As for governing, working through networks and deliberative 
governance means that the partners of policy making are no longer 
elected representatives of the demos, but philanthropic or self-
interested groups. Such groups have access to resources, decision 
makers, communication, media and funding and thus discriminate 
against those who lack resources. There is no accountability. The 
main vow of democratic politics – self-rule of the people by the 
people for the people – is being severely damaged as the sovereign 
people has no priority in terms of decision making, the public interest 
is not clear in a borderless world and it is not clear who governance 
networks work for – as they have no democratic legitimacy.  
 
229 Crucially, networks of governance are almost always composed of 
those who have interests in the matter at hand. Instead of protecting 
the people from private and particular interest groups, which usually 
command the resources and the power, global governance adopts 
them as part of the web of decision makers. The silent majority is out 
of the web of stakeholders’ deliberation. The self-selectivity of 
governance by networks, their lack of accountability and 
responsibility and the bias in their participation in the policy-making 
process, makes it highly problematic. Governing by networks actually 
undermines the legitimacy of sovereign states and democratic 
processes, as well as weakening the demos as the main unit of self-
rule by incorporating those with clear interests into the policy-
making process.  
 
230 Reinstating the demos within democracy 
 
231 The crisis of democracy has led to advances that favor plurality and 
freedom over equality. Can the demos be reconstructed as a core 
concept of democracy in a postnational constellation? Democracy is 
an on-going project. Citizenship is being extended from rich men to 
workers, to women, to immigrants. Politics is transformed and an 
active civil society enhances it. Yet at the core of the democratic 
project stands the individual, who becomes a political actor by way of 
belonging to a demos. Within this demos, a conversation and debates 
are going on about shared values, social policies, rights and wrongs. 
The basic value that holds this construction together is public 
equality between free individuals within a state, who form a political 
community. In our world, states can secure political rights. To go 
beyond the state should not mean to abandon the demos; multiethnic 
in its nature and hence remote from organic nationalism, and moving 
toward greater human rights on an international scale as a regulative 
norm, the evolving, equality-striving demos as a creation of 
democratic states is a guiding principle of humanism. It is therefore 
still a viable route to claim a civic demos at the heart of democratic 
polity as the main institutional design to embed public equality. Both 
universal rights as an ever-extending horizon for democracy, and a 
rich active civil society within the public sphere, should enrich rather 
than undermine the on-going discussion of the demos and provide 
new rather than fewer opportunities for equal citizens in sovereign 
states.  
 232 Democratic innovations 
 
233 New forms of participatory governance – often referred to as 
“democratic innovations” – are increasingly being enacted across the 
world in response to the failures of established institutions of 
representative government to promote and realize fully public 
equality. They are explicitly designed to increase and deepen 
participation by citizens in the political decision-making process. 
They are largely sponsored and organized by public authorities, 
although civil society organizations have also established democratic 
innovations independently or in collaboration with state actors. Such 
processes have engaged citizens in, for example, constitutional 
change, political reforms, formulation of public budgets, the 
implementation of social policies, and the monitoring of public 
services delivery. It is problematic, though, to generalize about their 
impact. Variations in design and implementation across the world 
mean that these institutions realize democratic goods in very 
different ways (Fung 2003; Smith 2009).  
 
234 The spread of participatory practice does not entail that all 
democratic innovations respond effectively to political and social 
inequalities and exclusions and have meaningful impact. Many 
processes are poorly organized and can have detrimental effects, 
reinforcing inequalities and mistrust in public authorities and the 
democratic process.  
 
235 But democratic innovations can be designed to overcome aspects of 
exclusion, giving voice to and increasing the well-being of politically 
and socially marginalized and disadvantaged social groups, increasing 
citizens’ competence and political skills and engaging citizens in the 
formulation and implementation of more just public and social 
policies. Citizens can exert meaningful influence, and in some cases 
control, over the decisions that affect their lives.  
 
236 Given the complexity of practice, this section is necessarily selective 
and illustrative. We discuss briefly the practice of four democratic 
designs and the different ways in which they enhance public equality. 
Participatory budgeting, policy councils and national public policy 
conferences originate from Latin America. This region has 
experienced an explosion of participatory governance following the 
period of redemocratization and decentralization that provided space 
for experimentation and institutionalization. The fourth innovation – 
randomly selected mini-publics – emerged in Europe and North 
America. Both participatory budgeting and mini-publics have 
experienced significant policy transfer. For further examples of 
democratic innovation, see Participedia http://participedia.net and 
LATINNO https://www.latinno.net/en/. 
 
237 Participatory budgeting 
 
238 Participatory budgeting (PB) is arguably the best known democratic 
innovation and was designed with explicit recognition of the 
structural disadvantage suffered by poorer citizens. Typically 
operating at the municipal level, citizens participate in the definition, 
formulation, decision, and control over significant proportions of the 
municipal budget. PB was first established in Porto Alegre in 1989 
and by the turn of the century around 16,600 citizens were 
participating annually in its popular assemblies, influencing the 
distribution of around $160 million in investments, Since then, PB has 
spread across Brazil and Latin America to more than 1,000 cities 
across Africa, Asia, Europe, North America and Oceania. While there is 
evidence that PB can be transferred effectively, what has been 
implemented under the name of PB has not always reflected earlier 
Latin American experience. Much rests on the willingness of political 
authorities and pressure from civil society to embed more 
participatory and redistributive practices, in particular restructuring 
bureaucratic practices to build civic infrastructure in poorer 
neighborhoods and ensure swift implementation of decisions.  
 
239 The attractiveness of PB, especially in Latin America, is tied to its 
capacity to ameliorate clientelism and corruption and generate a 
more equitable redistribution of public goods. Increased participation 
among disadvantaged, less educated and lower income groups 
reverses traditional patterns of influence on decision making on 
budget distribution. There is evidence that PB improves social well-
being, with increased spending in health care and decreases in infant 
mortality rates across Brazil’s largest cities.  
 
240 In its original form, PB was designed explicitly to separate demand-
making and rulemaking processes – both of which are controlled by 
citizens. In the demand phase, large numbers of citizens mobilize to 
propose and support local projects and hold the administration to 
account. In a separate rulemaking phase, elected citizen 
representatives (with limited terms of office) from each district of the 
city establish and apply the rules to distribute the budget. As no 
district or partisan interest is able to dominate, the rules that guide 
the distribution of resources tend to reflect considerations of social 
justice, prioritizing the needs of the poor and infrastructure and 
services deficiencies (Smith 2009).  
 
241 PB processes continue to innovate, developing digital and 
multichannel forms that broaden participation. For example, La Plata 
in Argentina combines offline, online and remote (SMS) voting, which 
in its 2010 cycle directly engaged around 50,000 citizens: 10 percent 
of the local eligible population, many resident in remote and 
marginalized areas of the city. There has also been experimentation 
with specific policy areas, committees and procedures (including 
quotas) dedicated to promoting the interests of women, young 
people, indigenous people and other politically excluded groups.  
 
242 Policy councils 
 
243 Policy councils bring together combinations of public officials, civil 
society organizations, ordinary citizens, private stakeholders, and 
service providers and users in areas such as development, 
infrastructure and social policies. In some countries, such as Brazil 
and Paraguay, virtually all cities have a form of policy council and 
there are national level councils in several countries. In Mexico, for 
example, there are at least 163 councils at the federal level with an 
advisory role on various fields of public policy, including 
environment, rural and economic development, culture, education, 
health, and security. The design of policy councils has varied as their 
practice spread, as has their capacity to provide a space in which 
marginalized social groups are able to advance their interests.  
 
244 The most common policy councils are advisory and restrict 
membership to state, civil society and private sector leaders, although 
they can be more open and embedded in decision making and 
administration at the local level. There is evidence that such 
structures can be used to promote inclusion, collaboration, 
transparency and accountability.  
 
245 A variation in design, management councils have a more explicit 
decision-making function, empowering citizens and civil society 
leaders in the formulation and implementation of policies in areas 
such as health, education and housing. In Brazil, all 5,570 
municipalities have a health council constituted by representatives of 
government institutions (25 percent), nongovernmental 
organizations (25 percent), and citizens (50 percent), who meet at 
least once every month to formulate health policies and oversee their 
implementation. Explicit attention is given to participation of citizens 
from poorer and traditionally excluded social groups to improve the 
responsiveness of the national health system to their needs.  
 
246 Where management councils are more concerned with redistributive 
policies and operate mostly at the local level, representative councils 
deal with recognition policies primarily at the national level. They are 
an explicit attempt to promote public equality and fight 
discrimination through the direct engagement of under-represented 
and minority groups in the policy process, particularly women, 
indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities, racial and religious groups – 
and more recently youth and the elderly. Representative councils 
tend to have an agenda-setting and monitoring role. Both Ecuador 
and Brazil have national policy councils for women, the elderly, 
people with disabilities and indigenous peoples. In Ecuador these and 
other councils were created in 2014 under the Law of the National 
Councils for Equality aimed at protecting minority rights. In Brazil, the 
national council for women’s policy has been responsible for the 
drafting and enforcement of the first national policy plans exclusively 
addressed to their needs, improving women’s representation and the 
realization of social rights (Pogrebinschi 2014).  
 
247 National public policy conferences 
 
248 National public policy conferences (NPPCs) are designed to overcome 
challenges of scale associated with participation in national level 
policy making. NPPCs connect citizens and civil society organizations 
through multiple and successive rounds of deliberation and 
representation at the local, regional and federal levels. Brazil has a 
long tradition of experimenting with NPPCs in more than fifty policy 
areas including health, education, culture, cities and racial equality. 
Again this democratic innovation has spread to other countries of 
Latin America with some interesting variation in format and scope 
(Pogrebinschi 2012).  
 
249 While initiated by the federal government, the NPPC process begins 
at the municipal level, where the first round of deliberations is open 
to anyone to participate. Delegates are elected to represent the 
municipality in the state (regional) conferences where they deliberate 
with public officials on the policy proposals originated from the local 
stage. Proposals and delegates are then sent to the final, national, 
stage, which generates a set of policy recommendations. While these 
proposals are not binding, there is evidence that in Brazil the 
government has taken these inputs seriously in the formulation of 
federal policies and laws, including policy areas such as food security 
and nutrition. As NPPCs become institutionalized in some policy 
areas, they have begun playing an important role in policy evaluation 
and monitoring.  
 250 The NPPCs have been particularly important in increasing inclusion, 
with impressive numbers of citizens taking part (7 million people are 
reported to have participated in 82 NPPCs that took place between 
2003 and 2011). Important social outcomes have been achieved, with 
NPPC proposals leading to progressive policy change in areas of 
gender, race, ethnicity, disabilities and age. Many of these policies 
recognize new groups and enact rights – including constitutional 
rights – for groups previously excluded from the policy process 
(Pogrebinschi 2014).  
 
251 Mini-publics 
 
252 Where the previous innovations have emerged from Latin America, 
mini-publics have been developed in North America and Europe, 
although their practice has spread to other continents. Mini-publics 
are defined by their use of random and stratified selection and 
facilitated deliberation amongst a diverse body of citizens who hear 
evidence from experts and witnesses and generate political 
recommendations. Mini-publics are typically used as consultative 
bodies by political decision makers. Examples include citizens’ juries, 
consensus conferences, deliberative polls, citizens’ assemblies and 
G1000s. The number of citizens selected and length of time they are 
brought together varies between 12 to 1,000 citizens over one day to 
several weekends (Smith 2009).  
 
253 Arguably the most impressive experimentation with mini-publics has 
been the citizens’ assemblies in Canada, the Netherlands and Ireland 
that have dealt with constitutional issues. Whereas other designs 
require citizens to participate for between one to five days, in Canada 
and the Netherlands citizens met over a series of weekends for a 
number of months, learning, deliberating, consulting and deciding on 
a new electoral system. In British Columbia and Ontario the 
provincial governments committed to put recommendations to a 
province-wide referendum. The Irish Constitutional Convention took 
the unusual step of including one-third politicians as members 
alongside randomly selected citizens. There is evidence that its 
recommendations were critical in bringing forward legislation on 
same-sex marriage.  
 
254 Mini-publics recruit a far more heterogeneous group of citizens than 
any legislature or other political institutions. Forms of random or 
stratified selection recall the fundamental democratic procedure of 
ancient Athenian democracy: no social group is systematically 
excluded; the equal status and value of all persons is recognized and 
affirmed. Inclusion in the deliberative process is promoted through 
active facilitation, ensuring that the process is not dominated by the 
politically confident.  
 
255 Mini-publics are one of the most researched democratic innovations 
and there is evidence that structured deliberation amongst such a 
socially diverse group of participants increases sensitivity to the 
perspectives and arguments of others and defends against group 
polarization that is common amongst more homogenous groups. 
There is growing evidence that citizens are willing and able to come 
to sound judgments and recommendations on highly complex and 
technical issues, and that there are positive effects on participants’ 
knowledge, interpersonal trust and political efficacy, and that the 
broader public views the judgments of mini-publics as credible and 
trustworthy.  
 
256 Institutionalizing democratic innovations 
 
257 Democratic innovations can be designed to better realize public 
equality in very different ways – for example, through random 
selection, group representation or rules that prioritize the interests of 
the politically marginalized. Institutional designs can empower 
minority groups, recognize new social and cultural identities, as well 
as incorporate historically marginalized groups in the public sphere. 
The practice of well-organized and politically salient innovations 
provides evidence that citizen participation can break political 
deadlocks, lead to decisions that redistribute state resources, refocus 
the delivery of public goods to those most in need and provide access 
to public services for the poor.  
 
258 The major challenge facing participatory governance is how 
democratic innovations can be embedded effectively within 
democratic systems. One aspect of this challenge is that the radical 
impulse and original designs of democratic innovations are often 
watered down as practice spreads. PB is a good example: many of the 
PBs across Latin America bear a strong family resemblance to early 
Brazilian practice. However, as it traveled to Europe and North 
America, many of the newer PBs were relatively poor imitations.  
 
259 The second challenge is that democratic innovations are too often 
either not given decision-making power or are poorly coupled or 
integrated with existing decision-making processes. One lesson from 
Latin America is the importance of political, administrative and fiscal 
autonomy for different levels of authority within a polity as a 
precondition for democratic experimentation and an opportunity to 
have a meaningful impact. But the decision to sponsor, organize and 
respond to democratic innovations is often at the discretion of elected 
or appointed public officials. When innovations are not 
institutionalized through norms or law, they can lose their force and 
undermine citizen efficacy. The internationally renowned PB in Porto 
Alegre exemplifies this challenge: it was not codified and was 
weakened by the incoming mayor as soon as the Workers Party lost 
control of the city. In other parts of Latin America, such as Peru and 
the Dominican Republic, PB is mandatory under national law. 
However, legal or constitutional codification can be a break on 
creativity and further innovation.  
 
260 An intriguing development is the emergence of autonomous public 
organizations charged with promoting public participation. The 
Quebec Environmental Public Hearings Board and the former Danish 
Board of Technology are rare examples of institutions that have been 
created by governments with the mandate to establish independent, 
high quality and recurrent practices of participatory governance in 
specified areas of policy (Bherer, Gauthier, and Simard 2014).  
 
261 Unsurprisingly, vested political and economic interests are suspicious 
of democratic innovations: when well designed, they open up the 
political process and promote public equality. But designing new and 
creative participatory institutions is not enough; it is crucial also to 
embed these practices within, alongside or, more radically, in place of 
representative institutions if democratic innovations are to 
contribute to overcoming political and social inequalities in 
contemporary democracies.  
 
262 Democracy below, beyond and across the state? Equality 
between citizens or states?  
 
263 We propose to give a unified account of the ideal of equality of voice 
across the domains of the domestic state and the international 
community. Some have thought that some variant of a democratic 
world state is the natural application of this idea. We argue that the 
ideal of political equality in the modern democratic state is a special 
case of a more general principle, which covers equality in collective 
decision making traditionally conceived and a kind of equality in the 
conditions under which voluntary agreements are made among 
separate parties. We argue for a principle of proportionality, which 
asserts that persons ought to have a say in some issue area that is 
proportional to the stake they have in that area. Proportionality is 
particularly useful in the context of international decision making 
where societies have very different stakes in the agreements they 
make. We define an ideal of fair negotiation among states that 
conforms to the broader ideal of equality. This is an individualistic 
ideal in the sense that the ultimate entity that is to have a say is the 
individual. States act as representatives of individuals in the process 
of making voluntary agreements.  
 264 Globalization 
 
265 The basic challenge of globalization to democracy is that the citizens 
of a democratic state are deeply affected by the policies and actions, 
or the lack thereof, of citizens in other states. Partly this is the 
consequence of the fact that certain goods, or bads such as pollution 
or the spread of disease, cannot be contained within the borders of 
states. Partly it is a consequence of decisions that states have made to 
increase openness to international trade and the movements of 
persons and capital. To the extent that the democratic principle 
implies that persons should have a voice in the basic conditions that 
affect their lives, there is a strong impulse to give citizenship a wider 
scope than it has had till now. Relatedly, the global community is 
currently facing some fundamental moral challenges, which can be 
recognized as such on virtually any scheme of morality. The aims 
include the preservation of international security and the protection 
of persons against serious and widespread violations of human rights. 
In addition, it must pursue the avoidance of global environmental 
catastrophe; the alleviation of severe global poverty; and the 
establishment of a decent system regulating international trade and 
the movements of people and capital. Meeting these challenges will 
require significant cooperation from many of the world’s states. As a 
consequence, there are moral duties on the part of the people who are 
members of different states to attempt to achieve effective 
cooperation with other people in pursuing these mandatory aims.  
 
266 All states have signed on to these aims (in the Millennium 
Development Goals, the United Nations Charter, the WTO and various 
environmental agreements) they make sense from the standpoint of 
any moral theory that takes the promotion, protection and respect for 
the fundamental interests of persons to be essential to a well ordered 
political system. The morally mandatory aims specify certain very 
weighty aims that it makes sense to require the international 
community to pursue, given its current capacities and challenges.  
 267 Fairness 
 
268 The question is, from the standpoint of democratic ideals, how are we 
to make decisions regarding how to pursue these aims? A natural 
thought here is that a fair process of decision making among states 
would be a majoritarian one. But this majoritarian idea can take 
different forms. One can imagine a majoritarianism of states such as 
one state, one vote. There are two problems with this approach that 
arguably attend many of the majoritarian approaches to international 
rulemaking. The first problem is that states are of very different size 
and so a majoritarian rule would not conform to the more 
fundamental principle that we want power apportioned to 
individuals in a way that treats individuals as equals.  
 
269 The second problem is that a majoritarian rule of this sort violates in 
some way the political and legal integrity of political societies. The 
political societies within what are initially arbitrary borders have 
developed highly integrated legal systems with integrated economic 
and social arrangements, as well as systems of accountability for 
transforming and adjusting these arrangements. States have arisen to 
establish justice and protect the basic needs of persons within limited 
areas. States have some interest in protecting the borders and the 
integrity of the systems operating within those borders in order to 
carry out their core responsibilities. From an international 
perspective, we have a kind of division of labor in which the world is 
divided into units that are capable of establishing justice in each unit 
(Goodin 1988).  
 
270 Hence, it is through state consent that democratic ideals be realized. 
But the requirement of consent must be modified in three ways: first, 
unreasonable refusal of consent must be excluded; second, consent 
must be given under fair conditions; third, state consent must be 
broadly representative of the people of the state.  
 
271 The justification for the state consent requirement is also grounded in 
the fact that there is a great deal of uncertainty as to how to pursue 
the morally mandatory aims. Though there is general agreement 
among scientists that the earth is warming up due to human activity, 
there is disagreement as to how much this is happening and how 
quickly or what a fair and efficient distribution of costs might be. The 
same uncertainties attend thinking about how to alleviate global 
poverty and how to protect persons from widespread human rights 
abuses. And there is significant disagreement about the limits of free 
trade and the methods for opening up trade as well as how to deal 
with the relationship between uneven development and trade. This 
kind of uncertainty, together with the centrality of states in making 
power accountable to persons, provides a reason for supporting a 
system of state consent with freedom to enter and exit arrangements 
because it supports a system that allows for a significant amount of 
experimentation in how to solve problems (Keohane and Victor 
2011).  
 
272 But the system of state consent must be heavily bounded given the 
morally mandatory need for cooperation. In the case of treaties that 
attempt to realize a system of cooperation that is necessary to the 
pursuit of morally mandatory aims, exit or the refusal to enter it must 
be accompanied by an acceptable explanation. States must lay out the 
reasons for thinking that the treaty would not contribute to solving 
the problem and that some alternative might be superior. The 
explanation must be in terms of the morally mandatory aims or in 
terms of a crushing or severely unfair cost of cooperation. The 
reasons given do not need to be the right reasons, but they must fall 
within the scope of what reasonable people can disagree on. For 
example, an explanation must not go against the vast majority of 
scientific opinion. A state must not free ride on others’ contributions 
to morally mandatory aims or refuse to shoulder the burden. The 
international community is permitted to pressure or coerce states 
that fail to provide adequate explanations for refusal to participate in 
cooperation for mandatory aims (Christiano 2015).  
 
273 In this context we have to think about one of the major effects of 
globalization, which is the increase in the relative bargaining power 
of capital over labor as a consequence of the increasing mobility of 
capital. Democratic societies have had increasing difficulty in 
imposing constraints on capital because of the threat of flight. This 
imbalance can only be rectified by states cooperating in producing an 
international regime of taxation and regulation of capital.  
 
274 How do we assess the fairness of state consent and the negotiations 
that lead up to this? A state’s consent to a treaty must not be coerced 
by the other party and must not be the consequence of fraud by the 
other party. And states cannot validly create obligations that violate 
the jus cogens norms.  
 
275 We can also see further norms through the lens of democratic theory. 
When a state engages in making agreements, contracts and other 
arrangements with other states, it is in effect attempting to shape the 
social world surrounding it. It alters the rights, duties and powers 
that other states have in relation to it. That world is the product of 
coordination and in part the product of conflict since states are able 
to shape this world more or less depending on how much social 
power they have.  
 
276 Just as a citizen participates in shaping the overall character of the 
society he lives in by participating in collective decision making about 
the overall collective features of the society, so a state shapes parts of 
the social world in which it exists by engaging in agreement making 
with others. The justification of these different powers of shaping the 
social world is grounded in the same common liberal concerns. 
Persons and the groups of which they are members have fundamental 
interests and concerns that often conflict and they disagree on how 
best to shape their common social worlds and so we give each person 
or group some power to pursue those interests.  
 
277 We want to assert here as a general principle that persons ought to 
have a say in a collective decision in proportion to the legitimate 
stakes they have in the decision (Brighouse and Fleurbaey 2010). On 
the whole persons ought to have an equal say in democratic decision 
making within states because they have roughly equal stakes in the 
set of decisions overall. Where there are unequal stakes, we distribute 
power unequally, as in federalist arrangements.  
 
278 Given the analogy of agreement making to democratic participation, 
we can see that the principle of proportionality applies to agreement 
making. In the case of voice, stakes are defined in terms of the whole 
range of plausible and legitimate alternatives in the different issue 
spaces. In the case of agreement making, the fundamental 
determinant of stake is the outside option or what a person or group 
can expect if no agreement is made with the other party, in other 
words, the value of exit. I have a lot at stake in an agreement if I 
would be very badly off without it. You have a lot less at stake if you 
would not be so badly off without the agreement.  
 
279 The fundamental argument for the principle of proportionality of 
power to stakes is that persons and groups of persons know their 
interests better than others do, normally. Thus in situations of conflict 
of interest, one should want the party with the most interest at stake 
to have more of a say if one is concerned with advancing the interests 
of persons.  
 
280 There are four key differences directly relevant to fairness between 
states and persons that complicate the application of the ideas of 
fairness to interstate transactions. First, states come with different 
size populations; second, states have very different levels of wealth 
for which the present generation cannot be held responsible 
(usually); third, these conditions occur against a background in which 
there are no higher order political institutions with the capacity to 
rectify serious differences of opportunity and information; fourth, the 
negotiations that create a international institutions are morally 
deeply fraught issues or at least more so than most ordinary 
negotiations. Two important structural differences also mark the 
transactions among states. Furthermore, there are a small number of 
states so the interactions among states never replicate the conditions 
of competitive markets, which sometimes play a large role in 
equalizing bargaining power among individual persons.  
 
281 Population and wealth are two important determinants of stake for 
states. From the standpoint of democratic theory, the power of a 
particular state in negotiation ought to be proportioned to population 
so that each state has power apportioned to per capita stakes. The 
role of wealth is not so straightforward. Suppose one has two 
societies at very different levels of wealth entering a negotiation. 
When impoverished societies negotiate with wealthy societies, they 
have a lot less wealth at stake but they have more at stake in some 
fundamental sense since their abilities to finance basic goods for their 
populations are at stake.  
 
282 One of the most fundamental puzzles in a system of free transactions 
among persons is that this principle of power proportionate to stakes 
can easily be violated. For example if you have two persons who 
depend on making an agreement to advance certain interests, the one 
who has the least stake will often have more power. This is because 
they can more easily afford no agreement. But this means that power 
is often inversely proportioned to stakes in a scheme of free 
transactions, while the normative principle tells us that power ought 
to be proportioned to stakes.  
 
283 The problem of inequality of stakes in international politics is 
extremely hard to solve because there is no higher political entity 
capable of rectifying the imbalance of power. The poor and the 
vulnerable are frequently in very difficult bargaining positions 
relative to wealthy and powerful societies as we see in trade 
negotiations and in environmental negotiations. But it is not as if 
nothing can be done here. First of all, multilateral and inclusive 
conferences tend to be helpful to poorer societies. Here transparency 
can play a significant role in making negotiations fairer because 
though rich and powerful states are willing and able to engage in very 
hard bargaining with poorer states, they do not like to be seen to be 
doing so, either to their own citizens or to the global public. If hard 
bargaining becomes too open, it becomes damaging to the 
reputations of powerful states, which reputations are important 
assets in international politics. Two, coalition building among poorer 
countries can also offset the tremendous bargaining power that 
comes with wealth. This is because the great majority of the world’s 
population is poor and the sheer size of this group can give it 
bargaining power (Narlikar 2012). This alteration of the bargaining 
situation is not unlike the change in bargaining between capital and 
labor that occurs when unions are allowed to form.  
284 
 285 Conclusion: Meeting the challenges 
 
286 We have so far discussed the underlying principle of public equality 
and a number of important challenges to its realization. As we saw, 
three kinds of challenges stand out. First, are the challenges that arise 
from socioeconomic inequality in society. Second, are the challenges 
that arise from the marginalization of minorities, women and the 
young. Third are the challenges stemming from  globalization, which 
reinforce many of these others. All three challenges are manifested in 
the rise of populism. Our proposals here are essentially institutional 
proposals that supplement those offered in Sections 1 and 2 on age 
groups, future generations, enhancing participation through 
democratic innovations, and the prospects for global democracy.  
 
287 The problems associated with the first challenge of socioeconomic 
inequality and its effect on the political system is discussed in much 
more detail in Chapter 13, but we will discuss here some institutional 
mechanisms by which the difficulties can be overcome. First let us get 
a quick characterization of the nature of the problem. The 
fundamental difficulty with the idea that economic inequality can 
issue in political inequality is that a society in which the affluent play 
the dominant role is one that violates the underlying principle of 
public equality. The idea is that the affluent have a much greater 
opportunity to influence the making of political decisions than do the 
less affluent. We hold to the fundamental democratic idea that 
persons’ conceptions of the common good unwittingly reflect their 
interests and their distinctive experiences. So a society in which the 
affluent dominate the processes of persuasion and political choice is 
one in which their interests are likely to be much better served than 
those of the rest of the society. There are a number of mechanisms by 
which this can happen. One, if electoral campaigns are financed 
privately, then the affluent will play the role of selecting like-minded 
people to run for election. Campaign contributions in the United 
States tend to come almost entirely from the upper 10 percent of the 
income distribution. This implies that these people are playing are 
dominating role in the setting of the agenda in political decision 
making. In this first mechanism, there need be no suggestion of 
corruption but it does imply that the interests of the affluent will be 
disproportionately advanced in these societies and the interests of 
others will be significantly ignored. But a second mechanism does 
suggest the possibility of corruption campaign finance contributions 
in return for promises to pass certain legislation favorable to the 
contributor. This is the main mechanism people think in terms of 
when they think of the influence of money on politics, but researchers 
have not found a great deal of evidence for this mechanism in the 
United States and Europe. A third mechanism relates in part to the 
process of globalization of markets. By virtue of its mobility, capital is 
able to secure good terms for itself from the political system simply 
by suggesting that it will move elsewhere or disinvest in some other 
way. It has a kind of independent political power in the political 
process. Charles Lindblom described this as the automatic 
punishment that business exercises over the political system. If 
stringent pollution controls are mandated by popular will, the 
business moves to an area where pollution control are less, thus 
imposing a cost in the form of unemployment on the political system. 
Other theorists have described this as the structural dependence of 
the state on capital. A fourth mechanism influences the generation of 
political opinion in modern societies. Most people rely, as Anthony 
Downs argued, on heavily subsidized transmissions of opinions and 
arguments in modern societies. Inevitably the main source of the 
subsidization of opinion consist in the affluent. As a consequence 
there is likely to be a significant bias in the system of information and 
opinion generation toward the interests and concerns of the affluent.  
 
288 All four of these mechanisms imply a great deal of inequality of 
opportunity to influence the democratic process and thus imply 
political inequality. Anthony Downs argued that inequality of political 
power is inevitable in modern societies. The question is: what kinds 
of institutions can mitigate these effects? Public financing of elections 
has been proposed as a partial solution to the first and second 
problems. A second kind of proposal is to have citizens assemblies of 
the sort analyzed in the democratic innovations section. They might 
deliberate about and propose potential pieces of legislation that 
would be subject to legislative votes or referenda. Here the idea is to 
insulate a significant part of the agenda setting power in a legislature 
from the influence of money. Another proposal for mitigating the 
effects of the independent power of capital might consist in the 
restructuring of corporations so that their boards represent the 
workers in the corporations and perhaps other stakeholders. This 
would bring about decision making that would be more reflective of 
the wider interests in society. It may also serve to mitigate some of 
the mechanism by which great inequality is created. A fourth 
proposal, suggested by Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres, would be to 
set up a voucher system for the support of interest groups and 
political parties, which might mitigate some of the domination of the 
affluent over the major media and interest groups. A fifth proposal is 
to attempt to revive and support organizations that advocate for the 
interests of working class and poor people such as unions. This could 
create a kind of independent source of knowledge generation.  
 
289 The second challenge is the subject of many of the sections on gender 
and minorities of this chapter. The problem is not primarily 
institutional though institutional reforms may help mitigate the 
problem. To put the point simply: for a democratic society to realize 
fully the equal citizenship of its members, people must see each other 
and treat each other as equals in the processes of democratic 
deliberation and communication generally. They must take each 
other seriously in the sense that they must listen to others and take 
their expressions of their conceptions of the common good and their 
own interests seriously. It is here that the marginalization of 
minorities and women can take an insidious and subtle form, but for 
all that a very powerful form. And of course, this marginalization can 
be compounded when persons are members of more than one 
marginalized group as studies of intersectionality suggest. This 
constitutes a threat to the political equality of citizens to the extent 
that being able to communicate one’s ideas and interests is essential 
to one’s ability to influence the political process. If a majority of 
persons or even a significant minority cannot but think of one as not 
to be taken very seriously then one cannot communicate effectively 
and one’s ability to influence the system is mitigated and one’s 
interests are not likely to be advanced very well.  
 
290 The marginalization of minorities and women in the democratic 
process can take two forms: it can take the form of an overt denial of 
civil and political rights, or it can involve a failure of processes to give 
voice to minority or marginalized voices. With regard to the former, 
common instances of these forms include voter suppression, enforced 
discrimination against minorities and women in the rules regulating 
economic and family life, and rules restricting the religious practices 
of minorities. There has been considerable progress over the last fifty 
years in many modern democracies toward the protection of the 
rights of minorities in terms of civil and political rights. There is some 
danger of backlash against these gains from the larger society, which 
has been discussed under the heading of populism. The latter forms 
of marginalization are more subtle and difficult to mitigate than those 
to the first. Probably the most prominent kinds of institutional fixes 
here are those having to do with representation. The idea is to give 
persons a stage on which they can express their views and which 
accords that expression legitimacy and authority. We have already 
looked at the role democratic innovations may play in this regard. 
Another, more mainstream, institution that may help with this is 
proportional representation. Thinking in terms of a kind of party list 
proportional representation, such a system enables a greater 
plurality of voices to get a hearing in the society. Single member 
district representation tends to displace the expression of the variety 
of interests and views in society to a less public place and takes it off 
the main legislative stage. Proportional representation tends to 
realize a more egalitarian representation of the plurality of views and 
interests in the society and it does so primarily by letting people 
choose for themselves what the important issues and identities are 
that they wish to associate themselves with. But to the extent that 
there are problems of marginalization that minorities wish to combat, 
it enables these minorities to form groups or play roles in shaping 
larger groups to be represented at the legislative level. So there may 
be better representation of interests and perspectives and there may 
also be better descriptive representation to the extent that minorities 
play the leading role in these parties. This can play a role in enhancing 
the legitimacy of minority voices and it may also put on display the 
diversity of voices within each minority. Proportional representation 
as an institution will not solve the problems entirely by any means. 
Other representation mechanisms may include quotas that ensure 
that a certain proportion of the representatives are women or are 
minorities.  
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